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ABSTRACT 
This paper intends to provide a coherent analysis of the 
united States position at the Geneva Conference on Indochina in 
1954. The paper is based on U.S. State Department documents, 
edited in 1981 in the Foreign Relations of the United States 
(FRUS) series. 
At the Berlin Conference in January 1954, the French, 
against the will of the United States, placed Indochina on the 
agenda of the Geneva Conference, which was to start on May 8, 
1954. The United States, concerned that the French might accept 
an unfavorable Communist settlement, regarded participation in 
the Conference as essential in light of their global 
anticommunist containment theory. 
From the Berlin Conference on until the middle of June, the 
United States tried to prevent a settlement which would result in 
the loss of Indochina to the Communists. Favoring a French 
military victory over the Vietminh, the United States indicated 
willingness to intervene on the French side in order to 
strengthen French determination to continue fighting. The 
documents show that the United states obviously designed military 
intervention in order to prevent a French surrender to the 
Communists, but not as a real alternative to end the war. 
While hoping for a French victory, the United States 
vigorously opposed the negotiations at Indochina. After the fall 
of the Laniel government on June 12, the new premier Pierre 
Mendes-France's determination to negotiate a settlement on 
Indochina forced the United states to rethink its position 
towards negotiations. The U.S. administration faced two 
possibilities, namely disassociation from the Conference, which 
might cause a worldwide loss of American prestige, or continued 
participation, which would make the United States responsible for 
the further development at Indochina. The administration knew 
that in all probability continued participation would result in 
American responsibility for a partition of Vietnam. 
With the decision to continue high-level representation at 
Geneva, President Dwight D. Eisenhower had decided for the latter 
option. His decision put the United States in a position where it 
could further support the Diem regime. Having participated in the 
Conference, the United states could also justify the maintenance-
-and later expansion--of the number of its Military Advisers as a 
necessary means to protect the democratic South Vietnamese 
regime. 
With the decision to continue participation at the Geneva 
Conference and in Indochina, the United States laid the 
foundations for later American involvement in Indochina. In light 
of this analysis, the Geneva Conference was a crucial step on the 
American road to Vietnam. 
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CHAPTER 1 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES POSITION 
IN INDOCHINA, 1945-1954 
In spring 1954, the United States found itself 
confronted with exactly the situation it had been trying to 
avoid. The United States, together with France, Great 
Britain, the USSR, Red China and the Associated States of 
Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, were to meet in Geneva in April 
1954 to negotiate a settlement for Indochina. The United 
States had always opposed negotiations with the Vietminh 
because it feared that negotiations might contribute to the 
loss of the "free world" to the Communists. Therefore in 
previous years, the United States had strongly supported 
France with military and economic aid, hoping that this 
support would enable the French to win the war against the 
Vietminh. But this French victory did not happen, and France 
pressed for a Conference to negotiate the Indochina problem. 
Agreeing to participate in the Geneva Conference in 1954, 
Washington further increased its commitment to Indochina. 
This paper examines the significance of the Geneva 
Conference for the American involvement in Vietnam. Whereas 
a large number of extensive studies on the Vietnam War 
exists, secondary literature on the Geneva Conference is 
2 
limited. Two insightful works are "Geneva 1954 11 by Robert 
Randle, written in 1969, and "Decision Against War: 
Eisenhower and Dienbienphu" by Melanie Billings-Yun, written 
in 1986. Both works, however, are only of limited use for 
today's scholar of the Geneva Conference. Randle's book, 
which gives a very detailed account of the Conference, 
suffers from a lack of access to primary documents. Randle 
bases his study to a large extent on newspaper and magazine 
reports, but knows relatively little about the State 
Department position. Billings-Yun's book focuses on one 
aspect only, namely the political and military context of 
the crisis at the French fortress Dienbienphu, which fell on 
May 7, 1954, and Washington's position toward this crisis. 
Her book provides an excellent account of the significance 
of this problem, but serves only as an introduction to the 
actual Conference. Although Randle's and Billing-Yun's books 
provide valuable information on the Geneva Conference, their 
value for a coherent study of the conference is limited. 
In 1981, the United States Government published the 
State Department documents on the Geneva Conference in the 
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series. 
Thereafter, mainly three historians, George c. Herring, 
Richard H. Immerman, and Gary Hess, made use of these 
documents as a primary source for detailed studies on the 
Geneva Conference. Their analyses focus primarily on two 
questions. First, they debate whether the United States ever 
3 
intended to intervene in Indochina, a question which has 
caused much discussion and confusion among historians. 
Especially Immerman and Herring contribute with studies on 
this topic in an attempt to clarify the United States 
position. Secondly, they examine the United States position 
and behavior at the Conference. Gary Hess in "Redefining the 
American position in Southeast Asia" gives a detailed 
account of the United states position towards negotiations 
before and during the Geneva Conference. 
This paper evaluates the State Department's position at 
the Conference as shown in the FRUS documents. It attempts 
to cover both problems mentioned above, the military aspect 
as well as the United States attitude toward negotiations. 
The analysis begins after the Berlin Conference in February 
1954. Two chapters examine the United States position toward 
military intervention before and after the fall of 
Dienbienphu on May 7, 1954, and one chapter focuses on the 
United States position toward negotiations before and during 
the Conference. In the concluding chapter, the attempt is 
made to combine the results of this analysis and interpret 
their relevance for later developments. The following 
chapter provides a short introduction, providing the 
background for the situation in Geneva and Indochina in 
1954. 
The United states' indirect involvement had begun long 
before 1954. Towards the end of World War II, President 
4 
Franklin D. Roosevelt had opposed the return of Indochina to 
France. However, for President Harry s. Truman, who was 
strongly determined to contain Soviet expansion, France 
became an important factor in deterring the spread of 
Communism. First, French assistance was necessary to balance 
Soviet power in Europe; secondly, France could directly 
fight Communism in Indochina. The U.S. State Department 
declared that it would cooperate "wholeheartedly" with 
France and, in the summer of 1945, firmly assured President 
Charles DeGaulle that it would not stand in the way of 
French sovereignty in Indochina. Initially, the American 
State Department's Asian experts warned of the dangers of 
identifying with French colonialism. Eventually, however, 
America's concerns with Europe outweighed skepticism towards 
French policy in Asia. The State Department concluded that 
an "immediate and vital interest" in keeping in power a 
"friendly government to assist in the furtherance of our 
aims in Europe" must "take precedence over active steps 
looking toward the realization of our objectives in 
Indochina. 111 
During the first three years of the Indochina War, the 
United States maintained a distinctly pro-French 
"neutrality." In October 1945, the French had returned to 
127 September 1948, U.S. Department of state, Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1948, 6 ([Washington, D.C.]: 
U.S. Department of State, 1974): 48 (hereafter FRUS, with 
year and volume number). 
5 
Indochina to take over control again. In March 1946, in an 
agreement with the President of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, the French recognized Ho Chi Minh's 
government as free state in the French Union. Ho, in turn, 
permitted the French army to enter his capital, Saigon. But 
only three months later, on 19 December 1946, Ho broke the 
agreement by launching a surprise attack on the French 
garrison in Hanoi. This was the beginning of the Vietnam 
War. 2 Since it did not want to support openly colonialism, 
the Truman administration gave France covert financial and 
military aid. 3 
France was determined to maintain its influence in 
Indochina. On March 8, 1949, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia 
became Associated States within the French Union. France 
established "native governments" which they hoped would 
capture strong nationalist support from the Vietnamese. They 
put Vietnam under the rule of Emperor Bao Dai, but their 
plans did not succeed. Bao Dai's power was limited and he 
did not get significant nationalist support. 4 The control 
of foreign and military affairs still lay in the hands of 
2Mehrin Gurtov, The First Vietnam Crisis (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1967), 3-6. 
3George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United 
States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York: Temple University 
Press, 1979), 3-10. 
4Gurtov, 21 . 
6 
the French. 5 The Associated States thus had national 
governments, but remained under French control. In February 
1950, Washington diplomatically recognized the Associated 
States "as independent States within the French Union116 and 
initiated plans to support them with economic and technical 
assistance. 7 
By 1950, the strategic context in Asia had changed 
dramatically. In 1949 Chiang Kai-shek's government in China 
had collapsed, and Mao Dse-dung's army advanced southward, 
raising the possibility of Chinese Communist collaboration 
with the Vietminh. The French, afraid of a defeat by the 
Communist forces, asked urgently for direct American 
military aid from late 1949 on, stating that otherwise they 
might be compelled to withdraw from Indochina. 8 Aware of 
this increasingly dangerous situation, the United States 
feared more than simply the loss of Indochina. The Truman 
administration was afraid that the Soviet Union, which was 
regarded as the driving force behind Mao's takeover in 
China, was determined to "impose its absolute authority on 
the rest of the world." 
5Andrew J. Rotter, The Path to Vietnam (Ithaka, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1987), 60. 
6Gurtov, 21, 2 2 . 
7Herring, 15. 
8Ibid. I 11. 
7 
This development in China led to the evolution of the 
domino-theory. Truman feared that American obstruction of 
France's appeals for aid in Indochina would lead to the loss 
of Indochina to the Communists, thus strengthening the 
Soviet bloc and tipping the balance of power against the 
United States. The Truman administration was concerned that 
after the fall of the first domino - Indochina, subsequently 
also the other dominoes - the Far East - would fall to 
Communism. 9 
This strategic reassessment of Communism during the 
Truman administration found its official expression in 
National Security Council 68 (NSC 68), formulated by Senator 
George F. Kennan in June 1950. From that time on, the United 
States explicitly viewed global anticommunist containment as 
a dominant goal of United States policy. NSC 68 required 
that the United States would oppose all Communist advances 
in order to avoid that the established balance of power 
would tip to Communist favor. 10 This strategic reassessment 
of 1949/50 led to the commitment of American military and 
economic assistance for the war against the Vietminh from 
late 1949 on and to direct American aid to the states of 
9Ibid., 12-14. 
10Richard A. Melanson, "The Foundations of Eisenhower's 
Foreign Policy," in Reevaluating Eisenhower, ed. Richard A. 
Melanson and David Mayers (Urbana and Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 1987), 34-37. 
8 
Indochina from early 1950 on. 11 The principles then 
developed provided the basis for United States policy in 
Vietnam for years to come. 12 
When North Korea invaded South Korea in 1950, the 
Truman administration, afraid that this Communist attack 
confirmed NSC 68 and indicated Communist expansionism, was 
even more determined to bolster Indochina as an anti-
communist bastion. 13 However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
decided that the United States could not commit military 
forces to Indochina as she had to commit a large number of 
troops to the Korean War. France, therefore, had to remain 
in Indochina and bear primary responsibility for the war. 
The United states agreed to provide military assistance. 14 
In June 1950, the United States sent arms to Indochina 
for the first time. After the Communists had started their 
offensive in Korea, Truman also decided to send military 
advisors to Saigon. 15 In late 1950, the United States 
committed $133 million of aid to Indochina. With the 
military situation in Indochina deteriorating during the 
next two years, France, which firmly resisted any American 
11 Leslie H. Gelb, Richard K. Betts, The Irony of 
Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington, D.C.: 1979), 279. 
12Herring, America's Longest War, 14. 
13Gurtov, 2 2 . 
14Herring, America's Longest War, 16-18. 
15Gurtov, 22, 23 · 
9 
influence in Indochina, nevertheless continued to demand 
increased military assistance and an expanded American 
commitment. Also, with a Korean truce raising the 
possibility of Chinese troops advancing to Indochina, France 
wanted a firm commitment from the U.S. to provide American 
combat forces should Chinese troops invade Vietnam. The 
United States, however, refused to commit ground forces 
under any circumstances. By 1952 the United States bore 
about one third of the cost of the war in Indochina. 16 
The United States meanwhile was extremely weary of 
committing military and financial assistance to France which 
had no intention of granting independence to Indochina and 
strengthening the Vietnamese army. But President Truman 
could not pull out because he viewed the United States' 
Indochina policy as closely related to its policy toward 
Europe. The key factor was the European Defense Community, a 
plan for the integration of French and German forces into a 
multinational army initially put forward by France to delay 
German rearmament. Truman considered this treaty to be 
absolutely necessary in order to create a strong European 
bulwark against the USSR and Communism. France threatened 
not to sign the EDC treaty if the United States stopped to 
support French Indochina policy. Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson accurately described this ploy as "blackmail. 1117 
16Herring, America's Longest War, 19-22. 
17 b 'd I 1 ., 23. 
10 
Truman's successor, President Dwight o. Eisenhower, 
continued Truman's policy towards France and Indochina. The 
Republican administration under Eisenhower not only pursued 
Truman's policy of support, but showed an even stronger 
determination to help the French defeat the Vietminh. To 
receive continued aid the French would have to give detailed 
and specific information about French military operations to 
the United states. It would also have to develop a new, 
aggressive strategy with an explicit timetable for the 
defeat of the Vietminh's main forces. 18 
The French government accepted Washington's demands by 
introducing the Navarre Plan, named after Henri Navarre, the 
French commander who was sent to Indochina by mid 1953. This 
plan envisaged the buildup of French Union forces to an 
estimated strength of 550.000 men, consisting mainly of 
trained indigenous Vietnamese forces. 19 The United States 
hoped Vietnamese forces would be more determined to win than 
the French forces, which showed little willingness to fight 
for Vietnamese interests.~ 
In spring 1953, General Vo Nguyen Giap, commander in 
Chief of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), started an 
offensive and invaded large parts of Laos, Cambodia, and 
18 b 'd I 1 ., 25,26. 
19Robert Randle, Geneva 1954, (Princeton, NJ.: 
Princeton University Press, 1969), 9,10. 
20Herring, America's Longest War, 20. 
11 
Vietnam. By early fall of 1953 the Vietminh, under Giap's 
leadership, controlled more than half of Vietnam. 21 In the 
meantime, a large number of Frenchmen had become war-weary 
and considered the war to be militarily hopeless, 
politically dead and economically ruinous. 22 By July 1953, 
French public opinion put increased pressure on its 
government to stop the war through negotiations.~ The 
United States feared nothing more than a negotiated 
settlement, which would mean "the eventual loss to Communism 
not only of Indochina but of the whole of Southeast Asia." 
By September 1953 the Eisenhower administration agreed to 
provide France with an additional $385 million in military 
assistance, hoping that this support would enable the French 
to win a decisive military victory. By this time the two 
nations were "caught up in a tangle of mutual dependence and 
spiraling commitments, and the United States felt compelled 
to go along with France. 1124 The United States had initially 
sent small arms to aircraft and naval vessels. But by March 
1953 they were also shipping B-26 bombers, C-119 Flying 
Boxcars, tanks, increased arms, ammunition, trucks, and 
medical supplies. The estimate in mid-1954 was that the 
total value of American military supplies sent to Indochina 
21Randle, 8. 
22Ibid. I 6. 
23Herring, America's Longest War, 26. 
24rbid., 21. 
12 
since 1946 amounted to more than $2 billion. 25 Between 1951 
and 1954 the total economic and technical assistance had 
been $96,000,ooo.oo, exclusive of the $385 million grant of 
September 1953 to spur the war effort. 26 
In September 1953, Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles for the first time developed a concrete alternative 
to the basically static and defense-oriented containment 
thesis. He implied that the United States would take 
countermeasures against a Chinese attack that might well 
carry beyond the Vietnamese border onto the China 
mainland: 27 
Communist China has been and now is training, equipping 
and supplying the communist forces in Indochina. The 
Communist Chinese regime should realize that such a 
second aggression could not occur without grave 
consequences which might not be confined to 
Indochina. 28 
Within six months after the United States and France 
had agreed upon the "end-the-war offensive" - determined to 
defeat the Vietminh - the military and political situation 
in Indochina drastically deteriorated. General Giap had 
surrounded the fortress Dienbienphu, a remote village in the 
northwest corner of Vietnam, where the French had major 
forces under the command of General Christian de la Croix de 
25Gurtov, 2 4 • 
26New York Times, July 5, 1954, 1, in: Gurtov, 24. 
27Gurtov, 32. 
28secretary of state John Foster Dulles, 2 September 
1953, in: Randle, 11. 
13 
Castries. The Vietnamese nationalists demanded complete 
independence and severance of all ties with France. The 
United States feared that the Vietnamese demands would 
provoke a French withdrawal and lead to Communist domination 
of Indochina. 29 
The French Government now considered to solve the 
Indochina problems through negotiations. The French hoped 
that the Soviet influence on Ho Chi Minh would enable them 
to secure a favorable settlement and placed Indochina on the 
agenda of an East-West conference. By that time, early 1954, 
Dulles' position toward a conference on Indochina had 
changed. In September 1953 he had declared that a 
prospective Korean conference agenda might also include the 
Indochina War if China would show willingness to stop 
supporting aggression in Indochina. 30 But by early 1954 he 
was afraid that France might see an Indochina conference as 
a chance of achieving a favorable settlement with the Soviet 
Union, which supported China and consequently the Vietminh. 
He therefore strongly opposed the scheduling of a conference 
which would consider Far Eastern problems. 31 Nevertheless, 
the Four Powers agreed to meet in Berlin in January 1954 to 
discuss the German question and the Austrian State Treaty. 
But the United States remained concerned that Far East 
29Herring, America's Longest War, 28. 
30Randle, 21, 22. 
31Herring, America's Longest War, 29. 
14 
topics might dominate the conference. It also feared that 
the soviets in this context might try to enforce the 
recognition of the People's Republic of China as Fifth 
Power. 32 
The Berlin Conference started on January 25, 1954. The 
Four Powers, represented by Britain's Foreign Secretary 
Anthony Eden, France's Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, the 
Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, and the US 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, could not reach an 
agreement on the German and Austrian problem. Concerning a 
possible conference on Korea and Indochina, the United 
States and France refused to agree to a Five-Power 
conference which would include China as the fifth power. 
During the last two weeks, they dealt with the question of 
the Korean political settlement, the Indochinese War, and 
the participation of the People's Republic of China. 33 
France's Bidault first opposed China's participation in an 
Indochina Conference, arguing that China supported the 
rebels in Indochina in a war which killed many French 
soldiers and caused much sorrow. Then Molotov hinted that a 
Conference with Red China could stop the war in 
Indochina. 34 At this point, France showed willingness to 
32Richard H. Immerman, "The United States and the 
Geneva Conference of 1954: A New Look," Diplomatic History 
14 (Winter 1990): 47. 
33Randle, 22-25. 
34Ibid. I 25. 
15 
negotiate if the Chinese People's Republic would halt its 
aid to the Vietminh. France finally agreed to accept China's 
participation in such a conference. 
Dulles was sure that sooner or later the French public 
would compel Bidault to enter negotiations. His sentiment 
was that United States' and Britain's support would 
strengthen Bidault's bargaining position concerning 
Indochina. Moreover, US participation would enable the 
United States to oppose a settlement too much in favor of 
the Communists. 3s 
On February 12, 1954, after heated discussion, the 
Western allies decided to hold a conference which would deal 
with both Korea and Indochina on April 15, and agreed to 
invite the PRC to this conference: 
The Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, the 
United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, meeting in Berlin, ... 
Prooose that a conference of representatives of 
the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese 
People's Republic, the Republic of Korea and the other 
countries the armed forces of which participated in the 
hostilities in Korea, and which desire to attend, shall 
meet in Geneva on April 26th for the purpose of 
reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question; 
Agree that the problem of restoring peace in Indo-
china will also be discussed at the conference, to 
which representatives of the United States, France, the 
United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, the Chinese People's Republic and other 
interested states will be invited. 36 
~Gurtov, 71-74. 
36Final Communique of the Berlin Conference, Berlin, 18 
February 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 7: 1205. 
16 
Dulles went along with this proposal as the United States 
did not want to be the only power to oppose a peaceful 
settlement of this major international crisis. 37 
Though not having directly participated in the 
Indochina war, its extensive involvement from 1945 on 
compelled the United States to pursue its policy of support 
and to take part in the Geneva Conference. The involvement 
had been a step-by-step commitment, leading to continuously 
increasing military and economic assistance. This U.S. 
policy had been regarded essential because of the close 
connection of European and Indochina policy and the United 





THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT POSITION TOWARD MILITARY 
INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA BEFORE THE FALL OF 
DIENBIENPHU 
In the months preceding the Geneva Conference it became 
clear that the French were unable to win the war without the 
United States military intervention. The situation at the 
French fortress Dienbienphu changed from bad to worse, 
forcing the French literally to beg for United States help. 
During these months, several highly complex considerations 
influenced the United States position toward military 
intervention at Dienbienphu. 
Dominating United States policy after the Berlin 
Conference was its fear that a negotiated settlement with 
the Communists would not "be consistent with basic United 
States objectives in Southeast Asia" because a settlement 
would probably lead to territorial or political concessions 
to the Communists. Negotiations could cause a loss of 
Indochina, which still was seen to be of strategic 
importance "to the security interests of the United States 
and the Free World in general." Therefore the United States 
favored a continuation of fighting by the French with the 
18 
"objective of seeking a military victory. 1138 This policy 
kept the United States out of the war, but still served the 
aim of containing communism. Washington decided to continue 
to supply money and hardware to Indochina in order to secure 
a French victory. The situation in Indochina was not 
considered to be critical; the general assumption was that 
the French would hold out at least until the Geneva 
Conference was over and a political settlement was found. 39 
The first major Vietminh attack against the French 
fortress of Dienbienphu on March 13, 1954, 40 forced the 
French to face the "likelihood of a serious military defeat" 
in Indochina. 41 Alarmed by this attack, General Paul Ely, 
the Chief of Staff of the French Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
arrived in Washington on March 20, 1954, 42 and indicated to 
the Secretary of State Dulles, General Douglas MacArthur, 
Admiral Arthur w. Radford and other members of the United 
States government, that General Navarre most urgently 
required "additional material assistance from the United 
38Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 12 March 
1954, the Secretary of Defense, Wilson, to the Secretary of 
State, Dulles, 23 March 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 16: 471-473. 
39Randle, 54. 
40Ibid. I 54. 
41George C. Herring, ""A Good Stout Effort": John 
Foster Dulles and the Indochina Crisis, 1954-1955," in John 
Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, ed. Richard 




States." Besides parachutes he asked for 40 more B-26 
aircraft, emphasizing that "the greatest military deficiency 
was in offensive air forces. 1143 Apart from this request for 
aircraft, Ely asked for the United States position in the 
case of Chinese aircraft intervention in Indochina. Dulles 
replied that he "would not attempt to answer" this question 
since it involved various unsolved factors concerning United 
states policy towards Indochina. 44 
Nevertheless, Ely's requests and questions forced the 
United States to declare its position. Following Ely's 
visit, two decisions were made which would determine the 
United States policy for months to come. First, the 
President agreed with Dulles that "we should not get 
involved in fighting in Indochina unless there were the 
political preconditions necessary for a successful 
outcome. 1145 Secondly, Dulles stated that even in the case 
of Chinese aircraft intervention "the Executive would still 
have to go to Congress before intervening in the Indochina 
43Memorandum for the Record by Captain G.W. Anderson, 
United States Navy, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Radford, 21 March 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 13: 
1140. 
44Memorandum of Conversation, by William R. Tyler of 
the Office of Western European Affairs, 23 March 1954, 
ibid. I 1143 • 
45Memorandum of Conversation with the President, by 
Dulles, 24 March 1954, ibid., 1150. 
20 
war. 1146 He also rejected Operation VULTURE, the plan for a 
single air strike at Dienbienphu, which had been promoted by 
Radford after Ely left Washington. 47 This caution shows 
that Dulles and Eisenhower did not intend to get involved in 
this war without the prospect of success and without 
political support in their own country, i.e. without 
political and constitutional backing. Still, attempting "to 
do something to avoid the accusation we would not help them 
in their hour of need, 1148 they permitted General Ely's 
material requests, but refused to intervene. 49 
Shortly after, on March 29, 1954, Secretary of state 
Dulles delivered a speech on "The Threat of a Red Asia" 
before the Overseas Press Club of America in New York City. 
In this speech he emphasized the strategic importance of 
Indochina for Southeast Asia, describing it as an area rich 
in raw materials and as a rice surplus area. He stressed the 
danger of Communism to Indochina and consequently the "free 
46Memorandum of Discussion at the 190th Meeting of the 
National Security Council, 25 March 1954, ibid., 1165. 
47Herring, "The Indochina Crisis," 217. 
48Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Dulles 
and Radford, 24 March 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 13: 1151. 
49Memorandum by Radford to the President, 24 March 
1954, ibid., 1158,59. 
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world", and finally set forth the United States policy 
regarding the present situation: 50 
Under the conditions of today, the imposition on 
Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist 
Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever 
means, would be a grave threat to the whole free 
community. The United States feels that the possibility 
should not be p,assively accepted but should be met by 
united action. 1 
Thus he had officially proposed another main factor which 
would determine the United States position towards 
Indochina. "United Action" would be a coalition by the 
United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and the Associated 
States, in order to deter Chinese intervention in the 
Indochina War and Chinese aggression elsewhere in Asia. 52 
Dulles hoped that the "mere establishment" of such a 
coalition would be sufficient to achieve these goals and "to 
bolster the French will to resist, thus making outside 
intervention unnecessary. 1153 
By the end of March 1954, following policies determined 
the United States position toward Indochina: no intervention 
without the fulfillment of certain political conditions 
which would secure a successful outcome; no intervention 
487. 
50Randle, 59, 60. 
51Editorial Note, 29 March 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 16: 
52Herring, America's Longest War, 31. 
53Herring, "The Indochina Crisis," 217. 
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without support by Congress; formation of some kind of 
"United Action" against the Communists, thus suggesting that 
the United States would not enter this fight alone, but only 
with support by its allies; and determination to reassure 
the French in their will to continue to fight, 54 hoping 
that United States intervention might become superfluous 
through a French victory. 
A few days later, United States policy toward Indochina 
became more decisive. In a conference with Congressional 
leaders, held on April 3, 1954, the administration decided 
that the President required congressional backing which 
would allow him to "use air and seapower in the area if he 
felt it necessary in the interest of national security." 
However, Congress refused any action without "commitments of 
a political and material nature from our allies, 1155 thus 
making the decision on United States intervention dependent 
on a prior political settlement on support by their allies. 
This decision also excluded Operation VULTURE. 56 Dulles was 
convinced that "Congress would be quite prepared to go along 
54Randle, 66. 
55Memorandum for the File of the Secretary of State, 5 
April 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 13: 1224. 
56Herring, America's Longest War, 32. 
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in some vigorous action if we were not doing it alone. 1157 
His task would now be to get this support by the allies. 
In the evening of the next day, April 4, 1954, 
Eisenhower agreed with Dulles and Radford 
on a plan to send American forces to Indo-China under 
certain strict conditions. First, a joint action with 
the British, including Australian and New Zealand 
troops, and if possible, participating units from such 
Far Eastern Countries as the Philippines and Thailand 
so that the forces would have Asiatic representation. 
Secondly, the French would have to continue to fight in 
Indo-China and bear full share of responsibility until 
the war was over. 
He also added a third condition "that would guarantee future 
independence to the Indo-Chinese states of Vietnam, Laos, 
and Cambodia. 1158 These three conditions, the forming of 
joint action, the maintenance of French troops in Indochina, 
and French guarantee of independence for the Associated 
States, remained decisive for the United States policy. 
The question arises whether the fulfillment of these 
conditions was possible or not. For the time being, however, 
they prevented any United States intervention because at 
least one of them - joint action - was far from being 
realized. Besides, definite pledges by the French on the 
other two points did not exist. The decision on joint 
57Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between 
Eisenhower and Dulles, 3 April 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 13: 
1230. 
58The only evidence of this meeting is found in Sherman 
Adams, Firsthand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower 
Administration (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), cited 
in Editorial Note, 4 April 1954, ibid., 1236. 
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action, moreover, depended on Congressional support, which 
would not be given without "satisfactory commitments" by the 
allies to go in collectively, and from France to 
"internationalize" the war and grant Vietnam 
independence. 59 And such commitments had not been reached 
yet. For the moment, United Stated intervention was not 
possible. 
If this was clear for the United States, it obviously 
was not at all clear for the French. On April 5, 1954, 
Douglas c. Dillon, the U.S. Ambassador to France, informed 
Dulles that the night before Foreign Minister Georges 
Bidault and Prime Minister Joseph Laniel had told him "that 
immediate armed intervention of United States carrier 
aircraft at Dienbienphu is now necessary to save the 
situation. 1160 They stated that 
... Ely brought back report from Washington that Radford 
gave him his personal assurance that if situation at 
Dienbienphu required United States naval air support he 
would do his best to obtain such help from United 
States government. Because of this information from 
Radford as reported by Ely, French Government now 
asking for United States carrier aircraft support at 
Dienbienphu. 61 
Obviously, French and U.S. views regarding their former 
discussions were completely different. Apparently Ely 
believed that the United States would approve "Operation 
59Herring, The Indochina Crisis, 218. 
60The Ambassador in France, Dillon, to the Department 
of State, 5 April 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 13: 1236,1237. 
61 Ibid., 1237. 
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VULTURE", a single and decisive airstrike at Dienbienphu, if 
the French formally requested it. 62 Since the United States 
records of the meeting between General Ely and U.S. 
officials at Washington, March 20-26, 1954, "contain no 
reference to such an undertaking by General Radford"63 , it 
is hard to say how this misunderstanding could occur and 
whose position was "correct." Richard Immerman suggests that 
the two men "simply misunderstood each other." They did not 
use an interpreter at this meeting, and Ely, who was not 
fluent in English, might have "heard what he wanted to 
hear. 1164 Eisenhower conjectured that "Radford thought he 
was talking to someone [Ely] in strict confidence," and he 
added that "he should never have told a foreign country he 
would do his best because they then start putting pressure 
on us. 1165 Thus, in this writer's view, he does not exclude 
the possibility that Radford had made certain concessions. 
However, this time the United States response to 
Bidault's request was very clear. The United States refused 
to enter the war without having solved the political aspects 
62Herring, America's Longest War, 29. 
63Dillon to the Department of State, Footnote 3, 5 
April 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 13: 1237. 
64Richard H. Immerman, Between the Unattainable and the 
Unacceptable, in: Reevaluating Eisenhower, by Richard 
Melanson and David Mayers (Urbana and Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 1987), 131. 
65Memorandum of Presidential Telephone Conversation, 5 
April 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 13: 1241. 
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and without support of Congress. Eisenhower commented to 
Dulles that "such move [armed intervention] is impossible" 
and "would be completely unconstitutional and 
indefensible. 1166 Eisenhower underestimated the importance 
of Dienbienphu and did not consider the matter urgent. He 
believed that "if Dienbienphu were lost to the French, it 
could hardly be described as a military defeat, since the 
French would have inflicted such great losses on the enemy." 
Therefore, at a National Security Council meeting on April 
6, he emphasized that 
there was no possibility whatever of United States 
unilateral intervention in Indochina, and we [the NSC] 
had best face that fact. 
Even if we tried such a course, we would have to take 
it to Congress and fight for it like dogs, with very 
little hope of success. 67 
At the same meeting Dulles repeated the three conditions 
agreed upon the day before: dependence on Congressional 
support on a coalition with the other free nations of 
Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and the British 
Commonwealth; French guarantee of independence for the 
Associated States; and the French promise to keep her forces 
in Indochina. 68 
66Ibid. I 1241. 
67Memorandum of Discussion at the 192d Meeting of the 
National Security Council, 6 April 1954, ibid., 1253,54. 
68Ibid. I 1254. 
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After March 29, Dulles feverishly promoted his plan for 
United Action. 69 He flew to London and Paris to discuss 
this program with the Foreign Ministers of Britain and 
France, Eden and Bidault, before all of them met at the 
Conference. To his disappointment, he met stubborn 
resistance not only by the British, 70 but also by the 
French.n Eden told him that "the British Chiefs of Staff 
were certain that air intervention at Dienbienphu would have 
no decisive effect on that battle" and considered it "better 
to wait and be sure where we are headed." He left open the 
possibility to discuss United Action if the Geneva 
negotiations would not lead to a settlement.n Eden 
obstructed the formation of United Action before the 
Indochina Conference and was not willing to go any further 
than agreeing to consider this problem if the Conference 
could reach no settlement. 
Dulles, who found the British position to be "most 
disheartening",~ guessed that Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill's increasing inability to cope with Parliament 
might have caused the United Kingdom's unwillingness to face 
69Herring, "The Indochina Crisis," 218. 
70Memorandum of Conversation, by Dulles, 25 April 1954, 
FRUS, 1952-1954 16: 554. 
71Herring, "The Indochina Crisis," 218. 
72Memorandum of Conversation, by Dulles, 25 April 1954, 
FRUS, 1952-1954 16: 553,554. 
~Ibid., 555. 
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up Indochina issues.~ Richard G. Casey, the Australian 
Minister for External Affairs, claimed "British fear that 
British and American intervention in Indo-China at this time 
would bring in the Communist Chinese and get us all 
embroiled in a war with Red China" 75 to be the reason for 
the United Kingdom's decision. Whatever the reason for the 
British refusal to United Action was, it blocked the 
fulfillment of one precondition for Congress support to 
United States intervention. 
Also Bidault opposed Dulles' plan. He made it clear 
that France would not support the continuation of a war for 
an independent Vietnam. He also rejected 
internationalization of the war which was a condition for a 
successful result.~ Thus Dulles' plan was obstructed by 
the British, the French, and Congress. Dulles knew that it 
was "manifestly impossible to intervene militarily in 
Indochina because of the necessary political arrangements 
which would have to be made."n Organizing these political 
arrangements would, if at all possible, take a very long 
~Dulles to Smith, 25 April 1954, ibid., 558,559. 
75Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Robertson, 25 
April 1954, ibid.: 558. 
76Herring, "The Indochina Crisis," 218. 
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time, or as Dulles put it, "will cause some delay. 1178 He 
feared that the French, without any hope for future support, 
might surrender unconditionally. 79 His proposal for "United 
Action" was aimed not at relieving the critical situation at 
Dienbienphu, but at keeping French spirits high. He did not 
believe that immediate air intervention would actually save 
the fortress. But for the time being, the hope for support 
by their allies might keep the French motivated to fight. 
United Action was considered to be a "very poor second 
choice to the present framework of the Navarre Plan" because 
it would imply that exactly this U.S.-supported plan for 
Indochina had failed. The United States still favored this 
program and was unwilling to admit its failure.~ 
Meanwhile the military situation at Dienbienphu had 
deteriorated to such an extent that Bidault and Ely, who 
considered it to be "virtually hopeless", again suggested to 
Dulles that "nothing could save the situation except perhaps 
"massive" air intervention which the United States would 
have to supply. 1181 Ely was convinced that Dienbienphu could 
~Dulles to the Embassy in France, 6 April 1954, FRUS, 
1952-1954 13: 1268. 
79Memorandum of Conversation, by Dulles, 25 April 1954, 
FRUS, 1952-1954 16: 556. 
80Memorandum by the Director of the Off ice of 
Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Bonsal, 22 April 
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81 Dulles to the Department of State, 22 April 1954, 
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be saved if about 200 or 300 US carrier aircraft would 
intervene as soon as possible, since in 3 or 4 days "such 
intervention would be meaningless. 1182 
The French Prime Minister Laniel stated that the fall 
of Dienbienphu would have profound effects on world 
politics. In all probability it would cause the fall of the 
French Government and consequently end the French resistance 
to a negotiated settlement.~ It would leave the French no 
choice but to accept a cease-fire. As a consequence, the 
Soviets would probably convince the French to object to the 
ratification of the EDC treaty, which the Soviet Union 
regarded as a threat to its power, in order to get a 
reasonable settlement regarding Indochina. Thus the fall of 
Dienbienphu could result in the failure of this program for 
Europe.M The French situation was desperate. For the first 
time, Laniel would favor internationalization of the war, if 
only Dienbienphu would be saved. He viewed armed 
intervention as the only way to save the situation. 85 
The United States' response to France's request does 
not come as a surprise. Dulles, strictly sticking to the 
82Memorandum of Conversation, by MacArthur, 23 April 
1954, ibid., 1371. 
83Memorandum of Conversation, by Robertson, 25 April 
1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 16: 557. 
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already familiar conditions of Congressional approval, 
collaboration with the British, and guarantee of 
independence for the Associated States, refused to 
intervene.~ With this decision, the fate of Dienbienphu 
was settled. The United states was not willing to intervene 
at Dienbienphu. Asked by American correspondents in Geneva 
on April 25, 1954, about the likely response to the severe 
crisis about Dienbienphu, Dulles stated that "our reaction 
would be, as it has been for a long time, one of very great 
sympathy." He "wouldn't like to see it fall, but some things 
have happened that we don't like and can't practically 
prevent. 1187 
In the light of these considerations, Bidault's later 
claim that on April 22 Dulles had offered him the loan of 
two atomic weapons seems highly implausible. No other 
evidence of such an offer exists in available French or 
American sources, and Dulles did not have the authority to 
take such a step.~ The United States insisted that the 
~emorandum of Conversation, by Robertson, 25 April 
1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 16: 557,558. 
87Transcript of Dulles' background meeting with 
American correspondents, 25 April 1954, Dulles to the 
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preconditions be fulfilled before it would intervene. 89 At 
the same time, the United States was aware that especially 
British participation to United Action and subsequently 
support by Congress could hardly be achieved. The judgement 
by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation, 
Livington T. Merchant, concerning this situation was "that 
these essential preconditions cannot be fulfilled and that 
in consequence the odds are overwhelmingly in favor of the 
loss of Indochina to the Communists. 1190 
The United States still tried to get support for United 
Action by the British, but realized that the outlook "seems 
pretty grim. 1191 The administration considered the 
possibility of organizing United Action without 
participation of the United Kingdom; the United states would 
"certainly pay attention if such a proposal came from 
Australia or New Zealand, but would not itself suggest 
it. 1192 
After he had had the opportunity to watch Molotov and 
Chou En-lai at the Geneva Conference on Korea, which had 
89Rene Cutler's summary of principal points made by 
Eisenhower in his talk with Republican leaders on 26 April 
1954, by the Acting Secretary of State, Robert Murphy, to 
Dulles, 28 April 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 16: 559; Editorial 
Note, 29 April 1954, ibid., 604,605; Murphy to Dulles, 29 
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begun on April 26, 1954, Dulles now himself feared that 
United States intervention might lead to open Chinese 
intervention and consequently to general war in Asia.93 It 
was still thought that the Navarre Plan, the original 
military concept for Indochina, would not be threatened if 
Dienbienphu fell, 94 but this event would have an 
"unsettling effect on the morale of French Union and 
particularly Vietnamese forces" and could cause the creation 
of a new French government which might be "willing to agree 
to unfavorable terms. 1195 Now the United States considered 
the uncertainty on the side of the Communists and the Allies 
regarding United States intentions in Indochina as their 
best card at Geneva. 96 The prospect for United states 
intervention would at the same time give the French hope and 
motivation to keep fighting97 and make the Soviets more 
93Dulles to the Department of State, 29 April 1954, 
ibid., 606,607. 
94Murphy to Dulles, 29 April 1954, ibid. , 616. 
95Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the U.S. 
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cautious. 98 The U.S. tactic was to keep that uncertainty 
alive just as long as possible.w 
The situation in Dienbienphu deteriorated further, and 
the United States showed no intention of changing its 
position and considering military aid to the French. In a 
meeting with 25 leading members of Congress, Dulles once 
more confirmed the United States decision not to intervene 
before the preconditions agreed on at the April 4 meeting 
were fulfilled. Outlining the events of the last two months, 
he stated that Bidault's two "informal requests" for an air 
strike at Dienbienphu had not been sufficient to justify 
U.S. participation. 100 Dulles had given up any hope to save 
Dienbienphu, which finally fell on 7 May 1954, the day 
before the Indochina Phase of the Geneva Conference began. 
During the past months, Eisenhower and Dulles had 
"obscured their intentions so well that they confused their 
contemporaries and baffled scholars." They had tried to make 
the French believe that they were about to intervene, while 
simultaneously following a course which excluded unilateral 
or immediate intervention. If they ever thought of 
98Memorandum by Heath to Smith, 3 May 1954, ibid., 674. 
99Memorandum by Bonsal to Robertson, 29 April 1954, 
ibid., 614; Memorandum by Heath to Smith, 3 May 1954, ibid., 
674. 
100Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the 
United States Delegation, McBride, 2 May 1954, ibid., 
661,662. 
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intervention, it was limited to air and naval power; 101 in 
March they even had considered the possibility of a single 
air strike. The key to Eisenhower's and Dulles' policy seems 
to be United Action, a plan which, if carried through, would 
have been of enormous advantage for the United States. 
Eisenhower and Dulles hoped that the establishment of this 
coalition alone would make outside intervention unnecessary. 
Its threat for the Communists would possibly moderate their 
demands at Geneva and keep China from intervening in the 
war. United Action would also motivate France in her will to 
resist. 102 If the French pulled out and military 
intervention could not be avoided, the United States would 
not have to fight it alone, but would have help from its 
allies. Thus it could not be blamed for entering a war for 
French colonialism. 103 This would leave the United States 
in a favorable position and would mean that it did not 
directly have to commit itself to intervention. 
The crucial question is whether United Action could 
have been realized or not. This coalition depended on 
numerous preconditions which would take a very long time to 
be fulfilled, and Dulles certainly was aware of this fact. 
Melanie Billings-Yun suggests that for Eisenhower United 
Action was merely "another way to delay and evade 
101eerring, "The Indochina Crisis," 217. 
1 ~Ibid. 
103eerring, America's Longest War, 30. 
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responsibility for the uncongenial decision of saying 
no" 1~ because it left the final decision to Congress. 
Immerman assumes that Eisenhower had not decided against 
intervention, "only against intervention under the present 
circumstances." 1M 
George Herring argues that Dulles' plan was so 
"cautious and flexible," that "it is indeed possible that 
United Action was all bluff, and that Eisenhower and Dulles 
never seriously contemplated the possibility of 
intervention. " 106 This writer agrees with Herring's 
conclusion. In fact, the preconditions to this coalition 
were so far-fetched, that it was more or less impossible to 
fulfill them. Alone creating United Action would take 
considerably longer than Dienbienphu would in all 
probability be able to resist the Vietminh attacks. Dulles 
knew this. 1~ But the indication that the United States 
considered help to the French made the United States look 
much better. The situation at Dienbienphu was horrible, and 
the world knew this. The denial of support would certainly 
not enhance the United States' reputation. Dulles did not 
104Melanie Billings-Yun, Decision Against War: 
Eisenhower and Dienbienphu, 1954 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1988), 82. 
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regard Dienbienphu as crucial for the Indochina War; 
however, he failed to understand its psychological impact on 
the French. 
United Action mainly served the purpose of saving face 
for the United States, avoiding direct intervention and 
commitment, warning the Communists, motivating the French to 
go on fighting - hope for the French and self-purpose for 




THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT POSITION TOWARD MILITARY 
INTERVENTION DURING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE 
In a Radio and Television Address delivered on May 7, 
1954, immediately after the fall of Dienbienphu, Dulles 
confirmed the United States position toward Indochina. He 
pointed out that the conditions agreed upon before the fall 
of the fortress, United Action, Congressional support, and 
nonwithdrawal of the French troops, remained crucial for 
United States intervention and would not be altered. Since 
these conditions had not been fulfilled, Dulles' speech 
reiterated that United States intervention was impossible 
for the time being. However, he conceded that if "an 
armistice or cease-fire were reached at Geneva which would 
provide a road to a Communist takeover and further 
aggression," this might accelerate United States efforts to 
create the conditions for United Action. 108 
Dulles' public address shows two things. First, the 
United States Administration maintained its previous course 
toward Indochina, showing no intention of intervening. The 
United States expressed sympathy, but found itself in no 
108Radio and Television Address to the Nation by Dulles, 
delivered in Washington, 7 May 1954, ibid., 721-726. 
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position "to participate with its armed forces" as long as 
the postulated preconditions were not fulfilled. Dulles 
showed no interest to reconsider or modify these conditions. 
second, the domino theory still applied to Indochina. The 
fear of a Communist takeover dominated United States 
policies toward Indochina. Only the severe threat of such a 
Communist takeover of Southeast Asia, made possible through 
an unsatisfactory settlement, would spur American efforts to 
work on fulfilling the required conditions. Otherwise the 
United States seemed in no hurry to meet the conditions. In 
short, the fall of Dienbienphu evoked no change in the 
United States position towards intervention in Indochina. 
This position still was the same as outlined by Dulles in 
the Overseas Press Club speech of March 29, 1954. The danger 
of a Communist Indochina had to be met by United Action, a 
coalition by the United states, the United Kingdom, France, 
Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and the 
Associated States, established in order to contain Communism 
in Indochina. 109 
On May 11, the United States government formulated a 
new and elaborate set of conditions which had to be 
fulfilled by the French before the United States would 
consider intervention. These conditions remained the 
decisive guideline for the United States position towards 
intervention. When the French Ambassador in the United 
109Randle, 177. 
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States, Henri Bonnet, indicated French interest in 
"internationalizing" the war on May 12, 1954, the United 
states responded with presenting this detailed new proposal. 
As before the fall of Dienbienphu, the United States based 
the framework for American intervention on two sets of 
conditions. First, the French needed to fulfill the proposed 
conditions. These conditions required: 
(a) That United States military participation had been 
formally requested by France and three Associated 
States; 
(b) That Thailand, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand 
and United Kingdom also had received similar 
invitations and that we were satisfied that first two 
would also accept at once; that next two would probably 
accept following Australian elections, if United States 
invokes ANZUS Treaty; and the United Kingdom would 
either participate or be acquiescent; 
(c) That some aspect of matter would be presented to UN 
promptly, such as by request from Laos, Cambodia or 
Thailand for peace observation commission; 
(d) That France guarantees to Associated States 
complete independence, including unqualified option to 
withdraw from French Union at any time; 
(e) France would undertake not to withdraw its forces 
from Indochina during period of united action so that 
forces from United States - principally air and sea -
and others would be supplementary and not in 
substitution; 
(f) That agreement was reached on training of native 
troops and on command structure for united action. 110 
The United States regarded these conditions as 
"indispensable as basis for our action. 11111 
Second, the United States demanded the authorization or 
endorsement of all conditions by the French National 
110oulles to the Embassy in France, 11 May 1954, FRUS, 
1952-1954 13: 1534-1636. 
111 Ibid., 1535. 
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Assembly. Thus the United states wanted to ensure that the 
chosen course would be maintained by any French government 
even if the present government fell. The United States would 
only present the French request for intervention to Congress 
if this condition was fulfilled. This arrangement meant that 
the French had to meet the conditions and had to acquire 
approval by the National Assembly before the United States 
would even consider taking a French request to Congress. 
Obviously this lengthy process was designed to give American 
intervention a politically safe framework. 
The conditions show that the United States attitude 
towards intervention had stiffened since the fall of 
Dienbienphu. The United States still demanded United Action 
(point b), guarantee of complete independence to the 
Associated States (point d), and nonwithdrawal of French 
troops in case of United States intervention (point e). 
A new aspect of the conditions was the requirement of 
request for a peace observation commission from the United 
Nations (point c). In all probability, this condition would 
cause an additional time delay and would prolong the period 
between a French request for intervention and the 
intervention itself. As a significant difference to previous 
declarations, United Kingdom participation was not essential 
any more for the formation of United Action; it would be 
sufficient if the United Kingdom "would either participate 
or be acquiescent" (point b). With this moderation to the 
42 
original condition, Dulles intended to emphasize United 
states independence from Communist influences. By making 
United Action independent from British participation, he 
avoided to be "subject to UK veto, which in turn was in 
Asian matters largely subject to Indian veto, which in turn 
was largely subject to Communist veto. 11112 
Without doubt, the fulfillment of these conditions 
would require a large amount of negotiations. Also, it had 
to overcome many political difficulties, making its 
acceptance by the French very improbable. Moreover, the 
fulfillment of all conditions to United States satisfaction 
would certainly take a very long time. An immediate decision 
for intervention was therefore made impossible. However, the 
prospect of United States intervention would keep the French 
willing and determined "to pursue vigorously the military 
measures which are necessary to consolidate the French and 
Vietnamese position in the Tonkin delta. 11113 The United 
States would keep the French fighting without definitely 
committing herself, a tactic which she had practiced already 
before the fall of Dienbienphu. The United States had, 
again, successfully delayed a definite decision on 
intervention by making this decision dependent on at least 
112Memorandum of Conversation, by Dulles, 11 May 1954, 
ibid., 1533. 
113Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of 
Philippine and South East Asian Affairs, Day, to the Acting 
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 
Drumright, 14 May 1954, ibid., 1565. 
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temporarily insurmountable conditions. The further 
discussion concerning these conditions will be examined 
later, as actual progress was not made before the end of 
May. 
Meanwhile Franco-American talks dealt with a different 
problem. Due to the overt military participation by China at 
Dienbienphu and after, as well as to Communist pressure at 
Geneva, the French realized that they faced not only the 
Vietminh, but Communist China as the enemy. The danger of a 
Chinese air attack in Vietnam increasingly worried the 
French, but they were not ready to discuss this point on the 
basis of the new conditions. 114 Laniel therefore inquired 
about United States reaction in case of a Chinese air 
attack. 115 Dulles answered that a Chinese MIG 15 air attack 
"of course" would be embraced by collective security. 
However, if this air attack would occur before the 
conclusion of collective defense arrangements, the United 
States reaction would have to be judged "under circumstances 
of the moment." Obviously the United States response to the 
French request was vague. However, Congressional 
authorization was absolutely essential for any United States 
114Dillon to the Department of State, 10 May 1954, 
ibid., 1523; the Charge at Saigon, Mcclintock, to the 
Department of State, 10 May 1954, ibid., 1531. 
115Dillon to the Department of State, 14 May 1954, 
ibid• I 1567 • 
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action in this event, 116 and administrative officials 
drafted a Congressional resolution authorizing the President 
to employ Naval and Air forces in Indochina. 117 The 
Administration thus did not definitively exclude the 
possibility of intervention outside the framework of United 
Action, but it also was far from promising military support. 
The United States answer was neither yes nor no and was 
vague enough to be open to French interpretation. 
This vagueness obviously contributed to a 
misunderstanding between the French and the United States. 
Almost inevitably, the French interpreted the United States 
response as to their favor. They distinguished between 
possible United States intervention "because of continuation 
and aggravation of present military situation in Indochina," 
to which the present bilateral negotiations were a prelude, 
and "United States reaction to an all-out Chinese air 
attack. 11118 The French understood that in the latter case 
the President would "go to Congress and ask for 
discretionary authority to use US air power to defend the 
116Dulles to the Embassy in France, 15 May 1954, ibid., 
1570. 
117Draft Congressional Resolution, 17 May 1954, ibid., 
1585. 
118Dillon to the Department of state, 31 May 1954, 
ibid., 1642; Dillon to the Department of State, 30 May 1954, 
ibid o I 1639 • 
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delta. 11119 They still thought that earlier "United States 
statements ... that full-scale Chinese Communist 
intervention could not be permitted are still binding, 
whether or not there is time to create collective 
action. 11120 In their opinion, the United States' desire to 
meet the Communist danger would have priority over the 
fulfillment of the conditions. They obviously misinterpreted 
United States intentions and failed to understand the 
firmness of the United States position. 
However, the final United States response to this 
French demand for the commitment of American air power made 
clear that fulfillment of this demand was absolutely 
impossible. The United States was not willing "to intervene 
in China on any basis except united action" and "unless a 
joint Congressional resolution" ordered the President to go 
into China alone. 121 The only United states answer to an 
overt, unprovoked Chinese Communist aggression in South East 
Asia would be a declaration of war with Communist China, 
which needed to be bolstered by a firm agreement with other 
119Dillon to the Department of state, 28 May 1954 I 
ibid., 1629. 
1 ~Dillon to the Department of State, 30 May 1954, 
ibid., 1639. 
121Memorandum of Conversation between Eisenhower and 
General Cutler, 1 June 1954, ibid., 1648. 
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interested nations on collective counteraction to this 
Communist threat. 122 
Although this request had taken place outside the 
framework of the conditions, the United States had shown no 
intentions to intervene without fulfillment of the 
conditions. The United States position was extremely firm 
and left the French no choice. With this response to their 
request for United States help in the case of a Chinese air 
attack, the French had to realize that they were compelled 
to go along with the United States proposal, otherwise they 
could not expect to get any help from the United states. An 
increased Communist threat would only lead to accelerated 
efforts to meet the conditions, but not to any supportive 
military action. 
The administration examined the possible consequences 
that intervention based upon the conditions could have for 
the United States. The administration was aware that 
American intervention could in all probability not be done 
"cheaply" by air and naval forces, but would lead to the 
commitment of United states ground forces. 123 They feared 
that this would probably lead to intervention "on a massive 
scale," meaning war with the Chinese. The responsible 
officers were afraid that even limited participation of 
122Edi torial Note, Summary by General Cutler to Dulles, 
ibid., 1658. 
123Memorandum prepared in the Department of state, 
Points for Discussion, 11 May 1954, ibid., 1534. 
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primarily Naval and Air Forces might lead to this result and 
would cause a Chinese reaction, similar to the events in 
Korea a few years earlier. 124 
Although Eisenhower did not exclude the use of ground 
forces, he was hesitant to give an American commitment to 
this question. He considered sending some Marines, as long 
as the condition of going in together with other states, 
notably Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, 
and the Associated States, was met. United Kingdom 
participation, as outlined in the telegram to the French 
Ambassador Bonnet, was not a necessary condition any 
more. 125 
In the following days, the administration ordered 
specific studies on the contribution of American forces to 
Indochina. The administration had the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
formulate a Department of Defense position "as to the size 
and composition of US force contributions to be made and the 
command structure to be established. 11126 Also Eisenhower 
requested various departments and agencies to prepare 
"studies on the assumption that us armed forces intervene in 
the conflict in Indochina," both for the event of Chinese 
124Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Wilson, 20 
May 1954, ibid., 1591; Memorandum by Drumright to MacArthur, 
24 May 1954, ibid., 1606; Memorandum prepared in the 
Department of State, 11 May 1954, ibid., 1533. 
125Memorandum of Conversation, by Dulles, ibid., 1583. 
126Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Wilson, 20 
May 1954, ibid., 1590-1592. 
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armed intervention and Chinese non-intervention. 127 
The United States thus seriously analyzed and 
considered the options and consequences for United States 
intervention and even considered the use of ground forces. 
The thoroughness of the studies shows that the United States 
regarded this as a very important problem and was aware of 
the implications that intervention could cause. But although 
the United States undertook to do these studies and 
indicated willingness to intervene, the United States never 
gave a definite commitment of ground forces and avoided a 
clear statement on intervention. Thanks to the conditions on 
which any French request for United States intervention 
rested, the United States was still in a relatively 
uncommitted position and under no time pressure to formulate 
a clear statement. 
This American caution worried the French. 128 Their 
requirements were aimed at much larger and more active 
United States participation than the United States was 
prepared and willing to give, especially concerning the use 
of ground forces. 129 Secondary literature strongly suggests 
that the French posed several "demands of their (=the 
127Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National 
Security Council, Lay, to Dulles, 18 May 1954, ibid., 1581. 
1 ~Smith - Bidault Meeting, 24 May 1954, Smith to the 
Department of State, FRUS, 1952-1954 16: 903. 
129Memorandum by Drumright to MacArthur, 24 May 1954, 
FRUS, 1952-1954 13: 1606. 
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French) own which were unacceptable to Washington, 11130 like 
a token commitment of American ground forces and a 
commitment of air intervention in the event of a Chinese air 
attack. According to the documents, these points seem to 
have been subject to discussion only, not strict French 
conditions. 
The United States, however, suspected the French were 
using the possibility of United States intervention 
"primarily to strengthen their (=the French) hand at 
Geneva. 11131 Dulles doubted "that the French had really made 
up their minds whether or not they wanted to continue the 
war in Indochina with United States participation." He was 
afraid that the French simply tried to strengthen their 
bargaining position with the Communists at Geneva, who would 
probably be more lenient if confronted with the threat of 
United States military intervention. 132 
With the military situation of the French in Indochina 
rapidly deteriorating, 1n the United States maintained a 
cautious position. On May 21, 1954, Dulles explained "that 
130Herring and Immerman,""The Day We Didn't Go to War" 
Revisited", 362; Herring, America's Longest War, 38; 
Billings-Yun, 156; Immerman, "Between the Unattainable and 
the Unacceptable, 144. 
131Dillon to the Department of state, 18 May 1954, FRUS, 
1952-1954 13: 1579. 
132Memorandum of Discussion at the 198th Meeting of the 
NSC, 20 May 1954, ibid., 1588. 
1nBillings-Yun, 155. 
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military measures, which if taken in next few weeks could 
enable holding of Indochina, might be hopelessly inadequate 
two months from now if military and political situation 
Indochina continues to deteriorate." 1~ United States 
intervention, which thus was "subject to consideration in 
the light of day to day developments, 11135 if delayed too 
long "might be impractical for the United States ••• even if 
our pre-conditions were finally agreed to by the 
French. " 136 This statement practically gave the United 
States freedom of action. It meant that, even if the French 
fulfilled all conditions, the United States was not obliged 
to intervene. The United States thus avoided a definite 
commitment regarding intervention and left herself the 
chance to deny intervention even in the case that the 
conditions were fulfilled. 
Only after these developments (French request for 
United States military support in case of a Chinese air 
strike; United states evaluation of possible consequences of 
her intervention; French realization that United States 
military intervention needed to be based on the American 
proposal) had taken place, the negotiations of the 
134Dulles to the Embassy in France, 21 May 1954, FRUS, 
1952-1954 13: 1594. 
135Dulles to the Embassy in France, 17 May 1954, ibid., 
1576. 
136Memorandum of Discussion at the 198th Meeting of the 
National Security Council, 20 May 1954, ibid., 1588, 1589. 
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conditions became more detailed. In these negotiations, the 
French found three problems hardest to settle. The first 
problem, as outlined above, was the French desire to obtain 
United States ground forces commitment. The United States 
did not definitively commit herself. Thus the French could 
not get a definitive and positive answer to this problem. 
The second problem concerned clarifying independence for the 
Associated States (point d). In the opinion of the French 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Maurice Schumann, a 
declaration of independence for the Associated States and 
the creation of a right to their secession from the French 
Union implied that these States had never been independent 
members of the French Union before. He was afraid that a 
declaration of this kind would cause public protest and 
would lead to the fall of the present French government. 137 
The third problem concerned the point that French troops 
were not permitted to withdraw from Vietnam if United States 
troops came in (point e) . The French demanded "some degree 
of flexibility in regard to withdrawal of French forces from 
Indochina in the event of a substantial strengthening of the 
Vietnam National Army." They agreed that they would not 
remove their forces, but wanted to have the option of some 
reduction in their forces in this event. 138 These three 
137Dillon to the Department of state, 14 May 1954, 
ibid., 1567. 
138Dillon to the Department of state, 22 May 1954, 
ibid., 1601. 
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problems were subject to numerous and lengthy discussions 
between the French and the United States. 
on May 24, 1954, the status of negotiations on the 
conditions as presented to the French was as follows. 1~ 
The French accepted point (a), formal request by the French 
and the three Associated States for United States military 
participation. Points (b) and (c), invitation of other 
interested nations and presentation to the UN, were accepted 
in principle. The French regarded the former as essentially 
a United States responsibility since it primarily required 
the cooperation of the United States with other interested 
states, but not necessarily French action. The French 
Government stated that it would comment later on Point (d), 
independence for Associated States, but accepted Points (e) 
and (f), nonwithdrawal of French forces and training of 
native troops, despite some remaining uncertainties 
regarding point ( e) . 140 
The main part of the conditions had thus been agreed 
upon, with the exception of guarantee of independence to the 
Associated States, and uncertainties regarding nonwithdrawal 
of French troops from Indochina. Two days later, on May 26, 
the former problem was settled. Dulles presented a new offer 
to the French: if United States intervention in Indochina 
139compare with page 31. 
140Dillon to the Department of State, 24 May 1954, 
ibid• I 1603 • 
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became necessary, the President would not only ask Congress 
for authority to intervene, but might also "join with other 
countries concerned in a formal pledge of fulfillment of 
full independence and sovereignty to the Associated 
States. 11141 The French accepted this offer which for them 
had the advantage that not France alone, but several allies 
would be held responsible for the independence of the 
Associated States. 
The United States also settled the remaining point, the 
French desire to have more flexibility in regard to the 
withdrawal of its forces from Indochina, to French 
satisfaction. However, the documents contain no information 
on the "suggestions" regarding this point and only mention 
that Schumann "felt personally that they (=the suggestions) 
were entirely satisfactory. 11142 
With these problems settled, the United States and 
France had agreed upon the main conditions for United States 
intervention. Schumann was "very pleased" with the United 
States intentions to join with other countries in an 
agreement for Associated States independence and said that 
the "only things now remained unsettled were military 
conversations to arrange details of training, command 
structure, and war plans." He stated that the French were 
141 Dulles to the Embassy in France, 26 May 1954, ibid., 
1618. 
1 ~Dillon to the Department of State, 28 May 1954, 
ibid. ' 1628. 
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"most anxious" to start these talks immediately. In 
Bidault's opinion, an "increased show of Franco-American 
solidarity in Indochina was now vitally necessary in order 
to have any hope of sound progress at Geneva." He therefore 
suggested that the United States "take over responsibility 
for training Vietnamese Army" or "agree to provide 
assistance toward improving airfields in Indochina for use 
of jet aircraft. 11143 Both actions would demonstrate 
increased United states interest in and concern for 
Indochina and would consequently weaken the Communist 
bargaining strength at Geneva. The French anxiety to start 
military discussions to solve this problem showed that the 
French were interested in fulfilling the American 
conditions. By May 28, the French and the United States thus 
"had •.. reached accord in principle on political side. 111~ 
Although this agreement "in principle" had been 
reached, the question of United States intervention was 
still far from being definitively decided upon. The United 
States maintained a very cautious and hesitant attitude 
towards intervention. The French had not yet formally 
requested internationalization of the war, and Dulles was 
sure that "the French themselves have never yet really 
decided on whether they want the war to be 
143Ibid. 
144Dillon to the Department of State, 29 May 1954, 
ibid., 1635. 
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"internationalized"" or not. 145 Other points which were 
still to be discussed were the question whether it would be 
advisable for the U.S. President to issue a unilateral 
formal pledge of fulfillment of full independence and 
sovereignty of Vietnam, 146 and the problem of requesting 
internationalization from other nations. Regarding the 
latter, the French wanted to simplify this point, whereas 
the United States insisted on meeting her original 
condition. 147 Further uncertainties still existed 
concerning the furnishing of U.S. Marines, 148 and the lack 
of understanding by the French of the United States attitude 
toward Chinese aircraft intervention. 149 In short, al though 
an agreement "in principle" had been reached, several 
unsolved problems prohibited a definite agreement. 
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At this point, as France suffered increasing military 
losses at Indochina, the United States administration 
considered a diplomatic bluff. The United States, worried 
that actual intervention might result "in full scale 
hostilities with at least Communist China," would attempt to 
"give the Vietnamese the psychological lift of our 
intervention without our actually being required to 
intervene. 11150 Since the French would only ask for 
intervention if Geneva failed, 151 the United States 
considered to make clear "to Molotov and to Chou En-lai that 
if Giap intensifies his military action in the [Tonkin] 
delta, we would be forced to withdraw from the Geneva 
Conference and to concert military measures to meet a 
changing military situation." Somebody, either Eden or a 
United States representative, would inform Molotov and Chou 
En-lai that the change in the military situation, i.e. a 
Vietminh attack in the Tonkin Delta, had changed the 
conditions upon which the negotiations had been based. 
Therefore the United States considered itself as free to 
undertake any necessary countermeasures including unilateral 
military intervention. 
The "drawback" with this proposal was that Molotov and 
Chou "might believe we were bluffing." The United States 
150The Coordinator of the US Delegation, Johnson, to 
Smith, 6 June 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 16: 1047. 
151Dillon to the Department of state, 31 May 1954, FRUS, 
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would have to take this risk "because, in the last analysis, 
we ourselves don't know whether we are bluffing or not." 
United States public opinion towards such a "serious 
deterioration of the Franco - Vietnamese position in the 
Tonkin Delta followed by a Presidential appeal to Congress 
for the necessary authority to intervene militarily" was not 
known and might prohibit any further action along these 
lines. 152 
On the next day, June 7, General Walter Bedell Smith 
hinted to Molotov in a conversation that "intervention was 
the last thing the us Government desired to take." But, he 
stated, if Vietminh "appetites were too great and if they 
over-reached themselves a crisis could ensue which, he 
inferred, might well lead to us armed intervention." Molotov 
"seemed completely unimpressed" by this threat, 153 and the 
United States immediately dropped the plan. 
This attempt shows that the United States still 
regarded the threat of intervention as a bluff. They were 
not sure that it was a bluff only, but they were also not at 
all convinced that they were serious. Their single and 
cautious attempt to threaten Molotov was dropped immediately 
after they realized that it did not have the desired effect. 
They did not risk the danger connected with continuing their 
152Memorandum by Bonsal to Smith, 7 June 19 54, FRUS, 
1952-1954 16: 1051-1054. 
153Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United 
Stated Delegation, Page, 7 June 1954, ibid., 1060. 
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threat. This threat, after all, could lead to their actual 
involvement. On a handwritten note, attached to a memorandum 
by Bonsal to Smith, Robertson had stated that "I don't agree 
that we should attempt a 'bluff.' It might be called. 11154 
The 'bluff' indeed was short-lived and was neither 
considered as a real option for United States action nor as 
a plan for intervention. 
During a news conference the next day, June 8, 1954, 
Dulles announced "that the United States has no intentions 
of dealing with the Indochina situation unilaterally," nor 
did the Administration plan to seek additional authority 
from Congress to act in the matter. 155 The conditions had 
not been fulfilled, and Dulles was unsure whether the French 
treated the United States proposal seriously or were "toying 
with it just enough to use it as a talking point at 
Geneva. 11156 The United states therefore refused to "make a 
commitment at this time purely for French political 
purposes." 
By that time, the United States were severely annoyed 
about the French behavior towards the United States. A Joint 
Chiefs of staff discussion on June 10, 1954, agreed that 
154Footnote 1 to Memorandum by Bonsal to Smith, 7 June 
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"the French were practicing a form of blackmail, holding a 
sword of Damocles over our heads." They also diagnosed "many 
French actions ... as frantic, last minute careening in all 
directions to place responsibility for developments in 
Indochina on the United states," and they found several 
other flaws in the French tactic. 157 
Whereas the French obviously were under the impression 
"that American intervention had been agreed upon at a high 
level" and that the formal request for internationalization 
had already been made, the United States saw the situation 
differently. The American government still insisted that 
"only if the French Government fulfilled certain specified 
conditions, the President of the United States would then 
ask Congress for authority to use armed forces in 
Indochina. 11158 A French Government decision was absolutely 
necessary as a formal and official request for 
intervention. 159 The absence of this decision consequently 
excluded United States intervention under the present 
circumstances. 
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After the fall of the Laniel Government on June 12, 
1954, the U.S. Ambassador in France, Dillon, gave a very 
clear and concise summary of the situation: 
During past week, I have gathered the very definite 
impression that because of (a) reluctance to send 
ground forces to Indochina; (b) deterioration of 
military and political situation in Indochina during 
last month; (c) extreme reluctance, if not refusal, of 
ANZUS partners to consider joining US in any military 
intervention in Delta area, the chances of US 
responding favorably to French request for military 
assistance even after they have met all conditions are 
approximately nil. 160 
Considering the whole situation, he recommended that the 
State Department should give "serious consideration to 
promptly informing the French that because of either (a) the 
deterioration of the military situation in Indochina or (b) 
the reluctance of the ANZUS powers to take action, or both, 
the President is no longer prepared to request military 
intervention from the Congress even if the French should now 
fully meet our conditions. 11161 Although Dulles did not yet 
fully exclude the possibility of United States 
intervention, 162 it was understood by his speeches that 
there was "absolutely no prospect of any imminent US armed 
intervention in Indochina. 11163 Until after the November 
1~Dillon to the Department of State, 14 June 1954, 
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elections, the United states would not move in Indochina 
"regardless of what happens there." 1M Discussions on 
immediate intervention thus ended here. 
On June 24, the U.S. Charge d'Affairs at Saigon, Robert 
Mcclintock, concluded that it would be necessary and 
possible "to negotiate a treaty of collective defense for 
South East Asia", similar to the NATO treaty for Europe, 
instead of pursuing the possibility of intervention. 165 
From that time on, the attention shifted to the negotiations 
of this treaty, the South East Asian Treaty Organization 
(SEATO). Immediate intervention as a help for the critical 
situation in Indochina was not considered any more. 
After the fall of Dienbienphu, the United States had 
not significantly altered its course on intervention in 
Indochina. But whereas before the fall of Dienbienphu 
American intervention was impossible because the essential 
precondition of United Action could not be fulfilled within 
the militarily limited period of time, the situation was 
different after the fall of the fortress. Time pressure was 
less, and the United States indicated willingness to 
intervene by presenting a detailed program of conditions to 
be fulfilled by the French. The fulfillment of the 
conditions would be more complicated than the fulfillment of 
165McClintock to the Department of State, 24 June 1954, 
FRUS, 1952-1954 13: 1736-1741. 
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those set up before the fall of Dienbienphu. This offer was 
certainly meant seriously and was neither a bluff nor a 
threat. The administration seriously analyzed consequences 
for the United States in the event of intervention and set 
up several detailed studies on the contribution of United 
States forces. However, these studies were set up in late 
May. As the negotiations dragged on and on without results, 
the United States returned to her former cautious position 
and again used the pretense of willingness to intervene for 
her own purposes. Confronted with the possibility of 
American military intervention, the French kept fighting, 
the Communists were more cautious, and the United States 
kept a straight face. 
As the situation continued to deteriorate, the United 
States found a new excuse not to intervene. Since the 
military situation was worse by the middle of June than one 
month earlier, the conditions would not apply to this 
different situation, even if the French would finally 
fulfill them. Thus it is questionable how serious the 
intention of United States intervention based upon the 
conditions ever was. It seems that whenever intervention 
became necessary or the conditions were almost fulfilled, 
the United States found a new excuse and backed out of any 
commitment. 
In light of this analysis, Herring's and Immerman's 
statement that "Eisenhower and Dulles seem to have been much 
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more willing to intervene than the president later indicated 
in his memoirs" needs modification. 166 The documents 
confirm Eisenhower's statement that he never considered 
military intervention in Indochina. The administration seems 
to have pursued a "neither war not peace" policy167 by 
either posing conditions that could not be fulfilled or 
last-minute backing out with requesting fulfillment of 
additional excuses or finding rather lame excuses, as e.g. a 
change in the military situation. 1~ 
The United States position towards intervention in 
Indochina thus followed a consistent course which underwent 
only minor changes. The administration never excluded 
intervention, but the conditions and requirements connected 
with intervention were set up in such a way that they could 
never be fulfilled in time. Moreover, whenever the French 
came close to fulfilling the conditions, the United States 
found new ones. The threat of intervention served the United 
States for several purposes, and she made use of this 
threat. However, before and during the Geneva Conference the 
administration never contemplated intervention on behalf of 
the French or as a means to fight a decisive victory in 
Indochina. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT POSITION TOWARD 
NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE AND DURING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE 
Two factors, the European Defense Community (EDC) and 
anticommunist containment, determined the United States 
position towards negotiations on Indochina. Concerning the 
EDC, the United States feared a French refusal to ratify the 
treaty unless the United States supported France in the 
Geneva negotiations of an Indochina settlement. 169 The 
administration dreaded a Communist cease-fire offer to the 
French who, eager to negotiate an ending of the war, might 
trade a settlement for abandoning EDC. 17° Consequently, the 
United states needed to oppose negotiations and strengthen 
the prospect for a French military victory over the 
Vietminh. 
The fear of a Communist takeover over Indochina was the 
second factor which contributed to the reserved American 
attitude towards negotiations. President Eisenhower had 
eagerly adopted the global anticommunist containment policy, 
as outlined in June 1950 in NSC 68. In Eisenhower's opinion, 
169Immerman, Between the Unacceptable and the 
Unattainable. 127. 
170stanley Karnov, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking 
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the United States was morally obliged to contain 
international Communism as part of her overall world 
strategy. 171 Faced with the prospect of negotiations with 
the Communist enemy, the Vietminh, Communist China and the 
Soviet Union, Dulles saw this established containment policy 
crumbling. He feared that the Chinese Communists, having 
concluded a truce in Korea, now directed their aggression on 
Indochina with the goal to "takeover" Southeast Asia. 1n 
This consideration had the same effect on the United 
States attitude towards negotiations as the EDC dilemma: the 
United States, afraid that negotiations might cause a cheap 
"sell-out" of Indochina to the Communists, dreaded to enter 
negotiations and favored a French military victory over the 
Vietminh. Having agreed to participate in a Conference on 
Indochina, the United States thus found itself at Geneva "in 
the awkward position of attending a conference that they did 
not support and whose outcome they feared. 11173 
Long before the opening of the Conference, the United 
States had decided to approach the Conference as another 
development of the Cold War and Anticommunist containment. 
171Richard A. Melanson, "The Foundations of Eisenhower's 
Foreign Policy," in Reevaluating Eisenhower, ed. Melanson 
and Mayers, 34-54; Martin F. Herz, The Vietnam War in 
Retrospect (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1954), 
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The dominant United States guideline at Geneva thus was to 
avoid any concessions to the Communists and any agreement 
that would acknowledge Communist aggression. Consequently, 
when by the end of March French expectations grew "that 
Geneva will produce a settlement for Indochina as a result 
of United States concessions to China," such as recognizing 
the regime, favoring Chinese United Nations admission, or 
liberalizing trade control, Dulles immediately made it clear 
to the French that this possibility did not exist. He 
declared that the "exchange of United States performance for 
Communist promises is a swindle and we will have no part in 
it. 11174 Refusing to approve the concessions which France 
had demanded, Dulles argued that "any settlement negotiated 
in [the) immediate future could only result in ultimate 
complete control of all Indochina by Communists." With this 
statement, he had excluded the option of a quick settlement. 
He had made it clear that at that point the United States 
showed no willingness to negotiate with the Communists. The 
fact that the United States objected to a settlement with 
the Communists before the Conference had even started 
certainly made prospects for a successful agreement 
unlikely. 
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Since the Berlin Conference the United States 
administration worked on formulating its position for the 
Conference, which officially was to begin on May 8. As a 
logical result of the political context, the United States 
regarded as their "major trump card" at Geneva the French 
"recognized military ability and determination" to defeat 
the Vietminh at Indochina. 1~ By the time of this 
statement, March 8, the administration still considered a 
French military victory probable. 176 A military victory 
would enable the French to resist tempting Communist cease-
fire offers1n and would compel the Communists to agree to 
a negotiated settlement "which would be more consistent with 
the basic United States objectives in Southeast Asia. 11178 
If the United States did not want the French to accept a 
compromise settlement, they had no choice but to support the 
continuation of the fighting at Indochina, to seek a 
military victory, and to stiffen the French resistance, 
maybe even with the offer to intervene. 1~ From the 
175Memorandum by Bonsal, 8 March 1954, ibid., 438,39. 
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American point of view, a "marked improvement" in the 
military situation was the basis for negotiations with any 
prospect for acceptable terms. 
On March 12, the Department of Defense issued a study 
which examined alternatives to a military victory. Focusing 
on the implications of a negotiated settlement, the study 
came to the conclusion that practically all possible courses 
of action, except continuation of fighting, would eventually 
lead to a Communist takeover. The establishment of a 
coalition government would "open the way for the ultimate 
seizure of control by the Communists," partition "would 
constitute recognition of a Communist territorial expansion 
achieved through force of arms," and free elections would in 
all probability lead to the loss of the Associated States to 
Communist control. The United States was determined to avoid 
these consequences which were incompatible with their 
principles, and to oppose any settlement which might cause 
these results. 180 
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The United Kingdom and France did not share this 
pessimistic United states opinion concerning a settlement. 
To Dulles' disappointment, the British were eager "to reach 
an agreed settlement at Geneva for the restoration of peace 
in Indochina. 11181 Already at Berlin, Eden had declared 
that the United Kingdom regarded Indochina as a problem 
between the United States and France, "with [the] United 
Kingdom standing on sidelines as an uninterested party." He 
was not willing to support the United States in her efforts 
to maintain the fighting at Indochina. Disturbed by this 
view, Dulles urged Eden to "stand firmly" with the American 
principles of opposing any solution which would cause the 
loss of Indochina. 182 
Dulles especially needed British cooperation for his 
plan to create a defensive alliance for South East Asia, the 
South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). He intended to 
establish this treaty to fight Communism in that area and to 
create a "real United states policy in Asia. 11183 Dulles 
wanted to establish this Southeast Asian alliance as soon as 
possible in order to support a French military victory over 
the Vietminh. Eden, however, did not share Dulles' opinion 
on the urgency of this treaty. His timing significantly 
181Editorial Note, 17 May 1954, ibid., 838. 
182Dulles to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 1 April 
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183Memorandum of Discussion at the 192d Meeting of the 
National Security Council, 6 April 1954, ibid., 1255,56. 
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differed from Dulles'. Eden intended to wait for the outcome 
of the negotiations before he would consider to enter a 
military alliance. For the time being, he was not willing to 
examine the possibility of a collective treaty which might 
commit the United Kingdom to fighting in Indochina. 1M His 
refusal to discuss the creation of a Southeast Asian 
alliance excluded this alternative to a negotiated 
settlement. 
The French were even more desperate than the British to 
achieve a settlement at Geneva and to establish a military 
cease-fire as a basis for negotiations at Geneva. 185 They 
were under increasing domestic pressure to accept a 
negotiated settlement, which in all likelihood would be 
incompatible with the United States principles. Expecting 
that a settlement might therefore be unacceptable in light 
of United States principles, the administration considered 
disassociating itself from such a settlement. Disassociation 
would leave her freedom of action and the chance to continue 
the fight against the Vietminh without French participation, 
but with the support of the Associated States and the United 
Kingdom. 186 
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In short, the intentions of the Western allies for 
Geneva were anything but unanimous. The British and the 
French were eager to obtain an immediate cease-fire and a 
settlement, whereas the United States opposed any such plans 
and wanted to maintain the fighting in Indochina. 187 Under 
these circumstances, the chance of finding a settlement 
which would suit all Allies was rather poor. 
From April 22-24, the foreign secretaries of Britain, 
France, and the United States discussed Indochina in Paris. 
Dulles pressed for United Action at Indochina in order to 
support the French against the Vietminh, especially in their 
militarily difficult situation at Dienbienphu. He hoped that 
United Action, which would strengthen the French military 
position in Indochina, would also strengthen the Western 
negotiating position at Geneva. 1~ At the same time, the 
administration was aware that the establishment of United 
Action would also provide several disadvantages for the 
Western position. United Action would emphasize French 
inability to defend the French Union against aggression and 
French dependence on United States or Allied intervention. 
The administration thus regarded United Action as "a very 
poor second choice, if carried to the action stage. 111~ 
187Dulles to the Department of State, 26 April 1954, 
ibid., 576. 
1 ~Hess, 129. 
1 ~Memorandum by Bonsal, 22 April 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 
16: 549. 
72 
The British refusal to join United Action made further 
discussion of this plan futile at this point. As the United 
States attempt to create an alliance had failed after the 
British refusal to discuss the treaty, now United Action 
failed as another alternative to negotiations. The British 
were not willing to commit themselves to military action in 
Indochina. Obviously an ending of the war had to be achieved 
at the Conference table and not at the battlefield. 
As the Conference came closer and the United States saw 
the chance of obtaining an acceptable settlement 
diminishing, State Department officials discussed whether 
the United States should participate in an unsatisfactory 
settlement or not. Participation in such a settlement would 
undoubtedly result in a worldwide loss of American prestige 
since the United States would have "backed down" to the 
Communist threat. Participation would also mean the loss "of 
the best available card that the United States had to play 
against French acceptance of such a settlement - French fear 
of provoking a profound breach between France and the United 
States." On the other hand, United States participation 
would enable the United States "to whittle down the degree 
of unacceptability" of the settlement and to protect the 
non-communist remainder of southeast Asia after the 
conclusion of the settlement. The avoidance of a French-
American breach would also make the conclusion of United 
Action more probable. Altogether, although the United States 
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opposed negotiations, it seemed to be in the United States' 
interest "to stay with the negotiations whatever might be 
the outcome. 11190 
Having realized that hardly any prospects for settling 
the war on the military plane existed, the United States 
administration decided on its tactics for the Conference as 
one of "influencing the course of the negotiations to the 
end that no agreement will be reached which is inconsistent 
with basic U.S. objectives." It planned to increase 
"Communist as well as Allied uncertainty as to U.S. 
intentions with regard to U.S. action in Indochina," and to 
strengthen French resistance to an unacceptable settlement. 
The decision to disassociate itself from the negotiations 
would have to be taken in the event of an unsatisfactory 
settlement. 191 Because the United States thought that all 
options - partition of Vietnam, a coalition government, a 
plebiscite and immediate elections - would eventually 
result in a Communist takeover of Vietnam, 192 it was 
obvious that an "acceptable" settlement would be very hard 
to find. The most promising solution in United States eyes' 
would be the holding of free and internationally supervised 
190Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States 
Delegation, Stelle, to Bowie, 1 May 1954, ibid., 645,46. 
191Memorandum by Heath to Smith, 3 May 1954, ibid., 
674,75. 
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elections a considerable time after the conclusion of a 
settlement. 193 
The Indochina Phase of the Geneva Conference began on 
May 8, 1954. Nine delegations participated in the 
negotiations: Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam (represented by two 
delegations), France, the United States, the Soviet Union, 
the United Kingdom, and Red China. Under Secretary Walter 
Bedell Smith, who headed the United States delegation, 194 
received his basic instructions from Dulles, 195 who had 
returned to Washington already on May 3. 196 These 
instructions confirmed the basic American principles that 
the United States took part in the Geneva Conference as "an 
interested nation which ... is neither a belligerent nor a 
principal in the negotiation. 11197 The United States would 
oppose any settlement that would lead to a Communist 
takeover and would consider to disassociate itself with any 
settlement that might imply such a result. 198 The United 
States would also refuse to "associate itself with any 
778. 
778. 
193Memorandum by Bonsal, 30 April 1954, ibid., 635. 
194Hess, 13 O. 
195Dulles to Smith, 12 May 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 16: 
196Randle, 173. 
197Dulles to Smith, 12 May 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 16: 
198Ibid., 778,79; Smith to the Department of State, 15 
May 1954, ibid., 807. 
75 
proposal from any source directed toward a cease-fire in 
advance of an acceptable agreement. 11199 
United States guidelines for an acceptable agreement 
demanded "to assure the independence and freedom of the 
states of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam" under international 
supervision. 200 An acceptable agreement further needed to 
provide for the evacuation of Vietminh forces from Laos and 
Cambodia, the examination of political and economic problems 
after the armistice, and contain no provisions for an 
armistice that would lead to a Communist takeover. 201 
During the first few weeks of the Conference, the 
United States Delegation blocked the negotiations. Smith, 
confronted with a Vietminh cease-fire proposal which 
suggested the partition of the Associated States, simply 
declared that he did "not believe we should seriously 
consider this proposal."~2 Dulles opposed the proposal by 
arguing that the proposal "might develop into [a] form of de 
facto partition. 11203 
199Dulles to Smith, 8 May 1954, ibid., 731. 
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Dulles also refused to discuss the British cease-fire 
proposal as a basis for negotiations. In his eyes, the 
British cease-fire proposal would "bring about a de facto 
partition of all three of the Associated States. Beyond 
that, since the Communists would certainly infiltrate the 
areas assigned to the other side, they would sooner or later 
obtain complete control of all three States. 11204 As he had 
opposed the Vietminh proposal for partition of the 
Associated States, Dulles now opposed the British proposal. 
He would not agree to temporary partition, which would 
eventually result in a permanent partition. The British 
proposal was not given further consideration. 205 
While blocking negotiations, Dulles again pushed the 
British towards considering establishing SEATO. He stressed 
the importance of continuing "preparations for collective 
efforts," even in the light of the uncertain situation in 
Indochina and Geneva. 206 During a news conference on May 
11, Dulles indicated a change in the United States position. 
Whereas up to this point the domino-theory had justified 
American decisions, Dulles now admitted that the creation of 
his proposed security arrangement, the SEATO, would be 
established "to save all of Southeast Asia if it can be 
204Memorandum of Discussion at the 199th Meeting of the 
National Security Council, 27 May 1954, ibid., 943. 
205Memorandum by Heath to Smith, 27 May 1954, ibid., 
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saved; if not, to save essential parts of it." He explicitly 
stated that "what we are trying to do is create a situation 
in Southeast Asia where the domino situation will not 
apply. 11207 This change in the United States attitude shows 
that the United States already foresaw the loss of territory 
to the Communists, but nevertheless hoped and intended to 
hold the rest of the area. 
However, a statement by the British Prime Minister, 
Winston Churchill, in the House of Commons on May 17, 
excluded any further discussion of this defense 
organization. Churchill declared that the British government 
would not make any final decisions "regarding the 
establishment of a collective defence in Southeast Asia and 
the Western Pacific" before the outcome of the Conference 
was known, 208 thus postponing collective defense until 
after the conclusion of a settlement. Dulles' hope for 
establishing SEATO before the reaching of a settlement had 
been destroyed. 
Having rejected the Vietminh proposal as well as the 
British proposal, the United States decided to discuss and 
207u.s.Department of state Bulletin 30 (24 May 1954), 
782. 
208Editorial Note, 17 May 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 16: 
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bolster the French proposal of May 8. 2~ This proposal 
demanded for Vietnam: 
1) grouping of the regular units of both parties in 
delimited zones to be determined by the Conference; 
2) disarmament of other combatants with exception of 
police forces which are recognized as necessary for 
maintenance of order; 
3) immediate freeing of prisoners of war and civilian 
internees; 
4) control of the carrying of these clauses by 
International Commissions; 
5) cessation of hostilities immediate upon signature of 
the agreement. 
Concerning Laos and Cambodia, all Vietminh forces had to be 
evacuated and "all elements which belong neither to the Army 
nor to the forces charged with the maintenance of order" had 
to be disarmed. These clauses had also required control by 
international commissions. Also, these agreements would have 
to be guaranteed by the member states of the Geneva 
Conference. 210 However, in the light of the tense situation 
and the largely incompatible positions at the Conference, 
the participants could not expect to reach immediate 
progress upon this proposal. 
By the beginning of June, the hostile situation in 
Geneva had not improved, but rather deteriorated. The 
tensions between the Western allies now became so obvious 
209Hess, 130; seventh Restricted Session on Indochina, 
27 May 1954, Smith to the Department of State, 27 (28] May 
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210smith to the Department of State, 8 May 1954, ibid., 
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that even Molotov noticed them. 211 Smith felt extremely 
offended by a British public demonstration of disloyalty on 
May 29, which he interpreted as British attempts "to distort 
and deceive" American intentions. He also found it 
increasingly difficult to evaluate French intentions. The 
French played two hands at once: while trying to achieve a 
political settlement at Geneva, they simultaneously 
attempted "to nudge [the United States] into some form of 
military participation." Yet the United States had long 
decided to follow its principle that unilateral military 
intervention was impossible, as Dulles had outlined already 
on March 29 in the Overseas Press Club speech • 212 Still, 
the United states increasingly worried that in the light of 
the continuing deterioration of the military situation in 
the Tonkin Delta, the French would feel further pressed "to 
accept almost any face-saving cease-fire formula. 11213 
In addition to the tense situation among the Allies 
themselves, the United States faced the Communists as a 
negotiation partner which demonstrated "absolute 
intransigence" and was unwilling to make any concessions 
211smith to Dulles, 30 May 1954, ibid., 977, 78. 
212Murphy to Dulles, 31 May 1954, ibid., 991. 
213smith to the Department of State, 3 June 1954, ibid., 
1014. 
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which would permit the beginning of effective discussions on 
Indochina. 214 
At a press briefing on May 27, Dulles admitted that he 
was at a loss regarding evaluation of the Communist 
position. The United States was left in the dark concerning 
Communist intentions, and Dulles had no idea whether the 
Communists would show "complete intransigence," would 
eventually move toward a compromise settlement, or would add 
unacceptable proposals. He only knew with certainty that "in 
dealing with Communists, you know, it takes infinite 
time. 11215 The inflexible positions of the participants at 
Geneva made an early conclusion of a settlement appear to be 
an illusion. 
Due to these incompatible positions, the talks at 
Geneva lacked progress on several issues. One such issue was 
the composition of an international supervisory commission 
and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Laos and 
Cambodia. 216 No agreement could be reached. The United 
States administration realized that an agreement on 
Indochina in the light of the Geneva conversations "cannot 
214seventh Restricted Session on Indochina, 27 May 1954, 
Smith to the Department of State, 27 [28] May 1954, ibid., 
947. 




be happy from the American point of view. 11217 Again, the 
administration discussed the question of whether the United 
States should participate in an unacceptable settlement, 
thus probably approving the loss of "key positions," or to 
disassociate itself from such a settlement. 218 General 
considerations in the United States now favored 
disassociation in order to protect the United States 
"tactical position" and "to avoid formal identification with 
open partition or the creation of two states where one now 
exists. 11219 Disassociation would simply help the United 
States to save face. 
As the negotiations dragged on without any progress, 
the United States discussed the possibility of withdrawing 
Under Secretary Walter Bedell Smith, the American 
representative from Geneva. In order to avoid 
misinterpretation of Smith's departure from the Conference 
as American "sabotage" of the Conference, Dulles arranged a 
trip of his own to Paris where he would meet Smith. 220 
The first two weeks of June brought no change in the 
negotiations. General Smith had realized by May 31 that the 
217Murphy to Dulles, 31 May 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 16: 
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course the negotiations were taking would probably result in 
a "division of Vietnam, no matter what it is called." 
Contrary to earlier United States considerations, he 
expressed the opinion that partition of Vietnam would not be 
the worst result for the United States because it might 
allow the United states "to save half of it. 11221 With this 
statement, Smith for the first time indicated a change in 
United States attitude towards Vietnam and the Conference. 
When Molotov returned from a visit to Moscow, which he 
had begun late in May, 222 his attitude had noticeably 
stiffened. Now it seemed impossible to Smith "to obtain an 
agreement except on Communist terms, 11223 meaning that the 
United States would be confronted with a settlement "which 
would be quite contrary to our principles." Dulles feared 
that the Soviets might blackmail the United States into 
guaranteeing a proposal which the French would accept and 
which the United States would have to guarantee in order not 
to lose face. 224 
221 smith to the Department of state, 31 May 1954, ibid., 
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In light of this highly inflexible Communist attitude, 
Dulles could hardly hope to obtain an acceptable settlement. 
On June 10, he admitted that "Geneva is getting us nowhere 
on Indochina except backwards. 11225 Eden conceded on the 
same day that perhaps the time had come to "admit our 
failure." Further negotiations seemed futile. 226 The talks 
had entered a deadlock. 
The fall of the Laniel Government on June 12, 1954, 
further weakened the Western bargaining position. 227 
Laniel's successor, Pierre Mendes-France, pledged to resign 
if he could not obtain a cease-fire in Indochina by July 
2 o, 228 thus putting heavy pressure on the participants of 
the Conference. Dulles, obviously tired of the tedious 
course of the negotiations, argued "that final adjournment 
of Conference is in our best interest" as long as it would 
be done without creating the impression that the United 
States deserted France. He thus agreed to the French 
proposal of keeping the Conference "at least nominally 
alive" by going into recess and maintaining only a small 
observation group at Geneva. 229 Dulles' additional 
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consideration was that this obvious failure of Geneva would 
again force Eden to reconsider collective action on the 
defense of Southeast Asia. 
While the United States thus anticipated the failure of 
the Conference, progress in the discussions came from an 
unexpected side when Molotov and Chou En-lai made important 
concessions on June 16 and 17. The Soviets offered 
compromises on the composition and the procedures of the 
international supervisory commission, and Chou En-lai agreed 
to the withdrawal of Vietminh "volunteers" from Laos and 
Cambodia. The Vietminh themselves indicated willingness to 
accept the temporary division of Vietnam. 
The Communist side obviously feared the consequences of 
a collapse of the negotiations. They still were interested 
in reaching a settlement, hoping that an agreement with the 
French government would encourage France's rejection of EDC. 
China also seemed increasingly afraid that a prolonged war 
might lead to American intervention. By offering an 
agreement, the Communists hoped to extinct this danger and 
at the same time to enhance their international prestige. 
The Communists also knew that their offer would increase the 
tensions between the allies, a fact which would probably 
enable them to influence the settlement to their 
advantage . 230 
230Hess, 133, 34. 
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The United states realized that the change in the 
Soviet position as well as the change in the French position 
required "rethinking" of the entire United States position 
regarding Indochina. 231 Partition of Vietnam now became 
increasingly probable. Since there would "of course be no 
question of United States participation in any attempt to 
"sell" a partition to non-communist Vietnamese, 11232 the 
question of United States disassociation from an Indochina 
settlement gained significance. 233 Afraid that the 
Eisenhower government might become connected with a 
partition of Vietnam, Dulles withdrew the original 
instructions for Smith and replaced them with the order to 
follow "specific instructions which may be given from time 
to time. 11234 
Smith and Dulles now realized that the consequences of 
the Conference could reach much further than they initially 
had foreseen. The possibility of United States' 
disassociation and reduction of participation raised "very 
important policy considerations" in the administration. Any 
settlement reached at Geneva under these conditions would 
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"establish a new balance between Communist power of 
aggression and free world power of resistance11235 and would 
confirm the growing importance of the Communists. Such a 
settlement would thus not only affect Indochina, but would 
challenge the entire global balance of power. Not being in a 
position to determine the further course of action on his 
own, Smith saw his task for the time being as making "that 
equilibrium [between Communists and the Western powers] as 
favorable as possible" and "to obtain through diplomatic 
united action as good a settlement as possible. 11236 
Although aware of the possible dangers of 
disassociation, the administration gave this option full 
consideration. As the main advantage, disassociation would 
avoid that the United States would be connected with 
concessions to the Vietminh or to the Communists. Since the 
developments at Geneva and in Indochina had made the 
possibility of an acceptable settlement "remote," 
disassociation would function as an ideal means to maintain 
American prestige. 237 Continued participation at Geneva, 
however, would give the United States a chance to influence 
the negotiations at Geneva and to strengthen the French in 
the negotiations. In addition, America's "strong card" at 
Geneva was the possibility to "trade willingness to give 
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full diplomatic support to France in their effort to sell 
settlement to Vietnam in return for a settlement that we can 
support." Obviously, this plan was designed to strengthen 
French belief in United States intentions to support 
them. 238 By the end of June, the administration had not 
decided upon which way to go, seemingly afraid to face the 
consequences of either option. Smith kept preparing for 
leaving Geneva, but the situation at the Conference remained 
as frustrating as it had since the beginning of the talks. 
From 25-27 June, Churchill and Eden met with Dulles in 
Washington to discuss a possible settlement. At this 
meeting, the United States administration had to face the 
fact that partition of Vietnam was inevitable and probably 
not temporary, but permanent. A joint statement of 29 June 
set forth the "minimum terms" that would allow the British 
and American governments to accept a negotiated settlement, 
consisting of following seven points: 1) the integrity and 
independence of Laos and Cambodia and the withdrawal of 
Vietminh forces from those countries; 2) retention of at 
least the southern half of Vietnam, and possibly an enclave 
in the Red River Delta; 3) no restrictions on Laos, 
Cambodia, and Southern Vietnam that impaired their ability 
to maintain stable non-Communist governments, including the 
right to maintain adequate forces, to import arms, and to 
238Dillon to the Department of State, 4 July 1954, FRUS, 
1952-1954 13: 1784,85. 
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employ foreign officers; 4) no political provisions which 
would risk the loss of the retained area to the Communists; 
5) no provisions precluding unification of Vietnam by 
peaceful means; 6) guarantees for the peaceful transfer of 
populations desiring to move from one section of Vietnam to 
the other; 7) effective international supervisory machinery. 
Two weeks later, this seven-point memorandum would become 
the basis for a settlement at Geneva. 239 
With the beginning of July, the Conference went into 
recess, and Smith left Geneva. The Conference had reached 
another deadlock. The situation finally changed when at a 
meeting on July 13 in Paris, Mendes-France begged Dulles to 
return to Geneva. He explicitly asked him to participate in 
the negotiations since in the Secretary's presence the 
Communists would "without question ..• agree to much more 
reasonable terms than if he were absent." Dulles rejected 
Mendes-France's plea by declaring that he was unwilling to 
participate in a "second Yalta." Since the situation at 
Geneva showed no possibility of improving, Dulles preferred 
representation at the Ambassadorial level to "high-level 
presence ..• [which] might prove an embarrassment to all 
concerned. 11240 
239Hess, 135,36; Herring, "The Indochina Crisis," 224; 
Dulles to the Embassy in France, 28 June 1954, FRUS, 1952-
1954 13: 1757,58. 
240Dulles to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 7 July 
1954, ibid., 1788; Dulles to the Embassy in France, 8 July 
1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 16: 1310. 
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President Eisenhower found himself in a dilemma. By 
sending Dulles or Smith back to Geneva, he risked being 
pushed towards approving the terms of a Communist 
settlement. By not sending them back, he would express 
disapproval, but might risk being blamed by the French for 
being an obstacle to a settlement. 241 Neither option was 
compatible with United States principles: the United States 
could not approve to any territorial concessions to the 
Communists, nor could she afford to be portrayed as the 
nation which prohibited successful negotiations. 
Although the question of participation could not be 
settled at the July 13 meeting, progress was achieved on the 
substance of a possible settlement. Dulles indicated 
American willingness to accept a settlement which conformed 
to the seven points proposal of June 29. 242 He argued that 
a date for elections should not be determined yet because 
the Communists would probably win immediate elections, but 
admitted that division of the country might "in all 
probability" be the best solution which would avoid the loss 
of the whole of Indochina. 243 Mendes-France was relieved to 
get these American concessions. He promised that "France 
241Hagerty Diary, 8 July 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 13: 1797: 
Memorandum of Conversation by Johnson, 13 July 1954, ibid., 
1824. 
242Dulles to the Embassy in France, 7 July 1954, ibid., 
1791,92. 
~3Ibid., 1792: Aldrich to the Department of State, 8 
July 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 16: 1304,5. 
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will do its best to get a settlement within the framework of 
the seven points." Moreover, he stated "with great 
earnestness" that he would take the responsibility for a 
settlement if it were unsatisfactory for the United States, 
thus taking another concern away from Dulles. With such a 
declaration, the United States could not be held responsible 
for a "failure" of the Conference and would avoid the 
threatened loss of prestige. 
Mendes-France also offered Dulles a reasonable proposal 
for a United States position towards a settlement. He 
suggested that the United States should make a unilateral 
statement with regard to any settlement reached within the 
framework of the seven points, declaring that the United 
States "will take action if the Communists break any 
settlement that is reached." In Dulles' opinion, the signing 
of such a statement "would present no problem. 11244 Finally, 
effective discussions had begun. 
A major breakthrough towards a final settlement took 
place on the following day, on July 14. The United States, 
while making it "crystal clear" that they would never 
guarantee a settlement which would indicate support of 
Communist aggression, agreed to making a unilateral 
statement declaring that the United States "would not resort 
244Memorandum of Conversation, by Johnson, 13 July 1954, 
FRUS, 1952-1954 13: 1823-26. 
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to force to upset an agreement if it were arrived at. 11245 
Again, the United States declared to be interested primarily 
as a "friendly nation" which would not seek "to impose its 
views in any way" upon the primarily interested participants 
of France, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. The United States 
declared its willingness to respect terms conforming to the 
seven points, but maintained the right to refuse to respect 
the terms in case they differed materially from the seven 
points. Thus the United States had gained a secure position 
at the negotiations: it could still participate and 
influence the course of the talks, but was not obliged to 
commit itself to any settlement. Dulles, who still opposed 
high level representation at Geneva, had to give in to 
pressure from President Eisenhower, and Under Secretary 
Walter Bedell Smith returned to the Conference. 246 
Although aware that the developments at Geneva would 
probably lead to an unfavorable settlement, the 
administration still had several reasons to be pleased with 
these developments. First, the necessity of United States 
participation at the Conference had proven that "when it 
really comes down to something important, the United States 
245Memorandum of Conversation, by Dulles, 14 July 1954, 
ibid., 1828,29; Memorandum of Conversation, by Dulles, 14 
July 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 16: 1362. 
246Memorandum of Conversation, by Dulles, 14 July 1954, 
ibid., 1363; France-United States Position Paper, 14 July 
1954, ibid., 1363,64; Mendes-France to Dulles, 14 July 1954, 
FRUS, 1952-1954 13: 1832; Dulles to Smith, 16 July 1954, 
ibid., 1843,44. 
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is the key nation. 11247 Second, the talks had demonstrated 
"anew the solidarity of the Western powers in the face of 
Communist hostility and intrigue, 11248 thus helping to 
maintain the established global balance. Third, being in a 
position where she could express approval or disapproval 
with the settlements, the United States was able to 
influence the further developments at Geneva and 
Indochina. 249 Moreover, since an end of the negotiations 
was in sight, Eden had expressed willingness to go ahead 
with the proposed alliance "very quickly." Eden and Dulles 
already planned to continue the efforts for a collective 
defense of Southeast Asia "to be taken in event of 
acceptable agreement. 11250 Looking back at the seemingly 
hopeless situation at the beginning of the Conference, 
Dulles certainly had enough reasons to be pleased with the 
developments. 
As the Conference resumed, the negotiations moved 
rapidly toward a settlement. Smith returned on July 17, but 
his influence on the settlement remained scant.~ 1 By July 
247Memorandum of Discussion at the 206th Meeting of the 
National Security Council, 15 July 1954, ibid., 1838. 
248Edi torial Note, 15 July 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 16: 
1375. 
249Ibid., 1376. 
~0smith to the Department of state, 19 July 1954, 
ibid., 1448; Smith to the Department of State, 19 July 1954, 
ibid. ' 14 65. 
251 rmmerman, "A New Look," 63. 
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19 and 20, bending to pressure from the Soviet Union and 
China, the Vietminh accepted the French position of a 
demarcation line at the seventeenth parallel instead of the 
thirteenth and to the holding of elections two years after 
the settlement. The international supervisory commission was 
agreed upon as being composed by members from Canada, India, 
and Poland. 252 
In the early hours of July 21, the French and the 
Vietminh signed the Geneva cease-fire Agreement. The Final 
Declaration of the Geneva Conference, also issued on 21 
July, was not signed by any of the delegations. 253 The 
United States refused to sign any of the agreements, but 
"took note" of the accords and vowed not to disturb them by 
the "threat or the use of force. 11254 With these 
declarations, the United States had successfully avoided 
committing itself in an agreement which, in the light of the 
fragile situation at Indochina, had not been able to exclude 
the possibility of further Communist victories over the 
Western allies in Indochina. 
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Eisenhower and Dulles were not entirely displeased with 
the outcome of the Conference. Knowing they the settlements 
could have been worse, they were content that their politics 
at least had forced Ho Chi Minh "to accept half a country at 
Geneva even though his armies controlled almost the entire 
country. 11255 Moreover, the two-year delay in elections gave 
the United States a chance to strengthen South Vietnam's 
resistance and opposition to Communism. Eisenhower and 
Dulles were confident that they could create a non-Communist 
alternative to the Vietminh. In a news conference on July 
23, Dulles declared that the United States regarded the fact 
that the Associated States had finally become independent as 
one of the most important aspects of the agreements. The 
future American goal would be to prevent a further loss of 
Southeast Asian territory to the Communists. 256 
In the aftermath of the Geneva Conference, the United 
States administration continued its policy of backing and 
supporting the Diem government in South Vietnam and rapidly 
eased the French out of Indochina. A NSC analysis of August 
1954 stated that the United States "must make every possible 
effort, not openly inconsistent with the United States 
position as to the armistice agreements ••• to maintain a 
255Moss, 60. 
256Herring, America's Longest War, 42. 
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friendly non-Communist South Vietnam and to prevent a 
Communist victory through all-Vietnam elections. 11257 
on September 8, the United States, Australia, New 
Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, France and Great Britain 
signed the SEATO treaty at the Manila Conference, 258 thus 
establishing a legal basis for intervention in Indochina. A 
separate protocol extended the protected area to include 
Laos, Cambodia, and south Vietnam, who could not formally 
participate in the treaty because of restrictions imposed by 
the Geneva Accords. 
In late 1954, the United States administration 
committed itself to a major aid program for South Vietnam. 
Having supported Diem in his first two years, the United 
States also backed the South Vietnamese blockade of the 1956 
elections. Now it became clear that the division of the 
country at the seventeenth parallel would turn into a 
permanent border. In early 1956, the American Military 
Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) took over from the 
French the role of training and organizing the Vietnamese 
Army. 259 The administration had under several subterfuges 
slowly augmented this group, which the Geneva Accords 
limited to a strength of 342 men, to a number of 692. 
257Ibid., 44. 
258oavid Mayers, "Eisenhower and Communism," in 
Reevaluating Eisenhower, ed. Melanson and Mayers, 102. 
259Billings-Yun, 158; Herring, America's Longest War, 
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Moreover, the United states provided roughly $85 million per 
year in military equipment for the Vietnamese Army. These 
developments of 1956 proved that the Geneva Accords provided 
no permanent political solution to the Indochina problem, 
but only a temporary military truce. 260 
The United States position toward negotiations had 
undergone several changes which significantly depended on 
and were connected with the military situation at Indochina. 
Until the middle of June 1954, the United States clearly 
opposed negotiations. During this time, the administration 
hoped that a French military victory would solve the problem 
without the necessity of negotiating a settlement. In order 
to obtain a French military victory, the United States 
encouraged French fighting by indicating that under certain 
circumstances the administration was willing to intervene, 
and refused to make constructive contributions to 
negotiations. 
When by the middle of June it became clear that the 
French military situation was hopeless, the United States' 
attitude changed from opposition to indecision. The 
administration realized that a negotiated settlement of the 
war would in all probability lead to major concessions by 
the French to the Communists, a possibility which was not 
consistent with United States principles for its Southeast 
Asian and global politics. The only alternative for the 
260Moss, 61. 
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United States to prevent an unfavorable settlement was to 
give firm American support to the French at Geneva. This 
option, however, would indicate significant United States 
interest in Indochina and might lead to a further 
commitment. The United States was trapped between the two 
possibilities of completely disassociating itself from the 
Conference, thus risking its worldwide loss of prestige and 
a Communist takeover of Indochina, or of further 
participating, thus becoming connected with and also 
responsible for the further development at Indochina. 
Considering the course the negotiations had taken, the 
United States knew that a settlement would in all 
probability partition Vietnam. Continued participation would 
put the United States in the position of accepting or at 
least respecting such a territorial success for the 
Communists and would indicate a failure of the American 
containment theory. 
On July 14, the United States decided for the latter 
option by announcing that Under Secretary Smith would return 
to Indochina. It was Eisenhower who, overruling Dulles, 
insisted on continued high-level representation at Geneva. 
With this decision, the United States demonstrated to the 
world that in the United States evaluation of the global 
situation, Indochina was important enough to risk further 
commitment. The United states, aware of the possible 
98 
consequences of such a decision, had chosen to express 





This paper intended to analyze the United States 
attitude towards the Geneva Conference of 1954, outlining 
the development of the United States position as shown in 
U.S. State Department documents. The paper concentrates on 
the United States responsibility for the course of the 
Conference and poses the question whether United States 
conduct at the Conference bore any significance for later 
American commitment in Indochina. 
The United States was an unwilling participant at the 
Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954. Still, its global 
policy forced the United States to attend the Conference, 
which was not only its best chance to influence the French 
decision on EDC, but also important for the American global 
strategy of anticommunist containment. The Eisenhower 
administration knew that only a strong French position would 
make possible French ratification of the European Defense 
Community. Moreover, the United States hoped that its 
participation at the Conference could avoid a loss of 
southeast Asian territory to the Communists. 
Having to decide upon a course to achieve an outcome at 
the Conference which would be as favorable as possible, the 
United States found itself confronted with two options of 
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influencing the developments at Indochina. The American 
administration realized that it could either chose to 
support the French militarily, or it could attempt to 
influence the negotiations. As United States analyses 
showed, either option had its disadvantages. Military 
support of the French would mean commitment in a war which 
might spread and even cause World War III. Negotiations, as 
the alternative, might lead to major political and 
territorial concessions to the Communists, an option which 
the United States was determined not to allow. 
Facing this dilemma, the administration had by early 
1954 decided to focus its political efforts on influencing 
the French to defeat the Vietminh militarily. To encourage 
the French to keep fighting and hopefully win decisively 
before the negotiations started, the United States indicated 
willingness to intervene. These efforts came to a peak when 
the military situation at Dienbienphu deteriorated in late 
April. Dulles now feverishly tried to organize United Action 
in order to support the French militarily and possibly 
enable them to win. United Action failed when the United 
States could not get sufficient support from its allies. 
This collective defense treaty for Southeast Asia never 
became reality. During the crisis at Dienbienphu, however, 
the United states had concealed its intentions very well, 
and the documents contain no evidence that the United States 
ever intended to intervene. United Action mainly seems to 
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have been designed as a holding action to keep the French 
fighting, but not as a real alternative to end the war. 
After the fall of Dienbienphu, Dulles, still 
maintaining alive the possibility of intervention, 
concentrated on establishing a collective defense treaty, 
the South East Asian Treaty Organization, SEATO. He hoped 
that SEATO would provide a collective defense for Southeast 
Asia and would be an effective means to defend the area of 
any future Communist attack. The establishment of SEATO 
demanded no great hurry as had been necessary in the case of 
United Action, which had required rapid action due to the 
impending fall of Dienbienphu. Still, Dulles hoped that a 
quick establishment of the SEATO treaty would significantly 
strengthen the French military position at Indochina as well 
as the western negotiating position at Geneva. However, the 
establishment of SEATO took too long to have any influence 
on the course of events during the Conference. The 
Conference ended before this collective defense treaty could 
be arranged. 
Both plans, United Action and SEATO, were never close 
to being realized before the end of the Conference, mainly 
because the conditions upon which they were based could 
hardly be fulfilled in time. United Action, for example, 
depended upon commitment by several allies, among them the 
British, who clearly stated that they were unwilling to 
commit themselves to fighting in Indochina. Washington knew 
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this, but did not change its course, thus excluding military 
help for the French. 
Concerning military intervention, the United States 
administration during the Conference played a game of trying 
to keep the French fighting as long as possible without 
becoming involved itself. Although Eisenhower and Dulles 
seriously had considered intervention before the fall of 
Dienbienphu, they had consequently embarked upon a course of 
noncommitment, hoping that the French might solve the 
problem without direct military American aid. 
The United States at the Geneva Conference obtained a 
tactic of blocking the negotiations, while at the same time 
encouraging the French to solve the problem at the 
battlefield. In order to strengthen French determination to 
win, the United States decided to morally support the French 
by indicating willingness to intervene. Since the United 
States knew that both collective actions, United Action and 
SEATO, could not be realized in the available amount of 
time, the United States actually left the military solution 
of the Indochina conflict exclusively to the French. As a 
consequence of this ambivalent United States position, the 
negotiations continued to drag on without any decisive 
results until the middle of June. 
With the fall of the Laniel government on June 12, the 
American hope for a military solution had been destroyed. 
The new Prime Minister Pierre Mendes-France was determined 
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to reach a negotiated settlement. Moreover, the drastic 
deterioration of the situation at Indochina which made a 
French victory highly improbable forced the United States to 
rethink its position. 
The United states now found itself in a dilemma. Since 
the administration no longer could put the whole 
responsibility for solving the conflict on French shoulders, 
it needed to decide whether the United States would 
disassociate itself from the Geneva Conference, thus risking 
being held responsible for a probable loss of Southeast Asia 
to the Communists. The other option, continued participation 
in the Conference, would provide the United States with the 
responsibility for a settlement reached at Geneva. The 
administration knew that in all probability a settlement 
would partition Vietnam, a solution which the United States 
had opposed from the beginning of the Conference as 
incompatible with its principles. Continued participation in 
the Conference would thus imply that the Communists had 
forced the United States to acknowledge Communist strength 
and to accept a settlement which was inconsistent with basic 
American principles. Facing this dilemma, Eisenhower, who 
during the negotiations never had overruled Dulles, for once 
demonstrated his authority. Against Dulles' opposition, 
Eisenhower decided to send Under Secretary Smith back to 
Geneva. Aware of the possible consequences of further 
participation, Eisenhower with this decision explicitly 
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expressed United States interest for Indochina and United 
States determination to maintain an influential position in 
Indochina. 
Smith returned to Geneva, and the United States agreed 
to respect the settlements which were signed on July 21, 
1954. The United States did not guarantee or take part in 
the agreements, thus maintaining large freedom of action. In 
a news conference on July 21, Eisenhower declared that "the 
United States had not itself been a party to or bound by the 
decision taken by the Conference, but it is our hope that it 
will lead to the establishment of peace consistent with the 
rights and needs of the countries concerned,"u1 thus 
expressing American intentions to further influence the 
course of events at Indochina. As later developments show, 
continued United States presence at the Conference allowed 
her to take over responsibility for South Vietnam, and to 
support and finally replace the French at Indochina. 
Further United States involvement in Vietnam started 
with increased American support for the Diem government, 
American support of blocking the 1956 elections, and an 
expansion of the number of United States military 
representatives, the Military Assistance and Advisory Group, 
at Indochina. 
u 1u.s., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of 
the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal 
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1954), 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954, 642. 
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United States' continued participation at the 
Conference and its nonconunitment to any binding agreements 
had allowed the United states to maintain its representation 
and influence in Indochina. Disassociation from the 
Conference would have made it very hard, if not even 
impossible, for the United states to justify its continued 
support for Diem as well as the presence of American 
Military Advisers in South Vietnam. But having respected the 
settlements, the United States could argue that its 
continued presence in Southeast Asia supported the 
democratic regime in its protection of the settlement. 
Continued participation at the Conference thus ·had put the 
United States in a position where it could maintain and 
later expand its influence in Indochina. 
In light of this paper's analysis, it seems safe to 
conclude that the roots for United States involvement in 
Indochina were laid during the last days of the Geneva 
Conference. The Geneva Conference was a crucial and decisive 
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